Fifteen common Myths about Hamas – and why we must fight against its Ban!

Editorial Note by Kommunistische Organisation (Communist Organisation)

This Article was originally published in German in February 2024. We sincerely thank the comrades of Magazin der Masse (Magazine of the Masses, MagMa) for translating the text into English and sharing it on their website.

Editorial Note by MagMa

This text was written chiefly for a German audience, but addresses this important theme with a combination of rigor and conciseness perhaps unmatched in any comparable texts available as of yet in English. Wherever specific German organizations or dynamics are mentioned, no reader for whom this text is intended will struggle to find significant parallels in their own local context, whatever that may be. While half a year has elapsed since its first publication in German, the information here remains as urgently relevant and as in desperate need of further propagation as in February—a sorry reflection on our current political moment. It remains clear that fully overcoming the lies propagated about the Palestinian resistance is a sine qua non for the development of any Palestine solidarity movement worthy of the name, and cannot be avoided, deferred, or minimized any longer. This text will no doubt serve as an indispensable aid to this essential task.

About this text

This text aims to achieve the following above all else: to clarify and refute those myths that are most frequently propagated about (and against) Hamas — and, as such, to serve as an aid in arguing against them. It should be made clear at the outset that not all of the myths discussed here are lies or false claims. On the contrary, they often have at least some kernel of truth. Demythologizing these myths here specifically means objectifying, substantiating, rebutting and, in certain cases, refuting them. This is primarily done in Chapter 4.

The text has been written in such a way that each myth can be read on its own. This allows the reader to »look up« specific issues without having to read the text (again) in full. Minor repetitions were as a consequence unavoidable.

At the same time, if the text is read as a whole (especially chapters 3 and 4), it will hopefully also provide a good introduction to, and overview of, the topic of »Hamas«.

The references thus serve two purposes: firstly, to enable verification and criticism; but also, secondly, to stimulate further discussion on the part of the reader, along with the literature and source recommendations (Chapter 2).

The introduction and the conclusion in particular refer to the political struggle in Germany, and are written as a contribution to the debate, as criticism, and as self‐criticism, aimed at the communist, left‐wing, Palestine solidarity and peace movements in Germany.

1. Introduction

On November 2, 2023, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior announced a ban on the activities of both Samidoun and Hamas. This was followed three weeks later by raids against alleged Hamas »sympathizers«. The armed wing of Hamas has already been on the EU terror list since 2001, and the organization itself since 2003. While various left‐wing organizations across Germany condemned the ban on Samidoun and expressed solidarity with them, virtually no one publicly condemned the ban on Hamas.¹

On the contrary, large sections of the German Palestine‐solidarity movement clearly distance themselves from Hamas. By this is not meant those who merely defended themselves against the accusations of being »Hamas supporters« or »sympathizers,« but organizations and individuals who publicly attacked Hamas, denied that it is part of the legitimate resistance of the Palestinians, or accused it of being a »terrorist organization« or similar.

The MLPD (Marxist‐Leninist Party of Germany) even officially called for the »fascist Hamas« to be banned, shortly after the German government had announced just such a ban.² It is hard to imagine how an organization that claims to be »unconditionally in solidarity with the Palestinian liberation struggle«³ could be more supportive of the government, more destructive of the Palestinian liberation movement, and more blatantly in line with the racist and imperialist repression carried out by the German government. Strangely enough though, the MLPD did not celebrate the actual ban on Hamas’ activities: from their point of view, shouldn’t this step have represented an »anti‐fascist victory«?

But even we as the Communist Organization (KO) have not yet taken an open stand against this ban, unlike with Samidoun⁴, or with Hezbollah three and a half years ago.⁵ In my view, however, such a condemnation of the ban is the correct position to take.

There are many leftists and communists who put forth various arguments against those who defend Hamas against unjustified criticism and even open propaganda and repression. In my view, most of these are bogus arguments or are based on false theoretical and factual assumptions. These misconceptions concern both the reality in and around Palestine in general and Hamas in particular. Of course, they are also often an expression of what I see as a false understanding of national liberation and its relationship to the class struggle. However, I cannot go into this point here; I have already done so elsewhere.⁶ Instead, here I intend firstly to dispel myths about Hamas, and, secondly, to argue why we must fight against their banning.

2. A brief overview of the history of Hamas

Hamas was founded in 1987 by the leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine.

a) The Muslim Brotherhood

The Brotherhood itself was founded in Egypt in 1928 and later established branches in various countries in the Arab world. Probably due to its status as the first such organization with mass roots, along with its reach and networking, it is considered as the »classic« political‐Islamic or »Islamist« organization. Marxist assessments and evaluations of the Muslim Brotherhood have varied considerably: In GDR publications, for example, it was generally labeled as »right‐wing extremist« (which seems questionable and problematic, not least for the adoption of the term »extremism« alone); more differentiated assessments can be found among some Trotskyist and »neo‐Marxist« authors.⁷ An analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood cannot be undertaken here, as the Brotherhood is more than the sum of its parts, and one would really have to first deal with at least its most important national subdivisions (Egypt, Tunisia, Palestine, Jordan and Syria) and their relationships to one another. (See also Myth 2)

In very general terms, however, we can roughly outline its basic character as follows: Its ideology is a religious‐nationalist one, which means that — unlike ISIS, for example — it recognizes the existing nation states and also the concept of the nation, and does not want to abolish it in favor of a (worldwide) caliphate; according to Helga Baumgarten, for Hamas the national framework even takes precedence over the pan‐Arabic framework or that of the ummah (i.e. the worldwide Islamic community).⁸

The Muslim Brotherhood is culturally conservative, economically liberal, and — according to its own self‐image — anti‐colonialist; it emerged as a response to the imperialist domination of the West over the Arab world and, in this struggle, stood up for its own »Islamic modernity«, thus combining the national liberation struggle not centrally with social revolutionary ideas (like the communists and, to some extent, the »Arab socialists«), but with a kind of »cultural struggle«. All of this corresponds to the (petty) bourgeois class character of the Muslim Brotherhood and its base (which, of course, also includes broader strata than the petty bourgeoisie).⁹

b) The Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine (1935 – 1987)

The issue of Palestine played an important role for the Muslim Brotherhood from its foundation, and the first official delegation was sent in 1935.¹⁰ However, it was not until the general strike of 1936, which led to a three‐year uprising, that the issue attracted greater interest and, for the first time, broader sympathy in Egypt.¹¹

The Brotherhood there collected money to support the strikers and organized a media and protest campaign. Fighters are also reported to have been sent from Egypt at the time. Immediately after the end of the Second World War, in the fall of 1945, the official branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Palestine: first in Jerusalem, then in Haifa, Jaffa, Gaza and other cities. Its membership rose to 20,000 by 1947. Nevertheless, it initially remained comparatively insignificant. Its policy focused on the political future of Palestine. To this end, it also cooperated with Christians and communists. After losing its trust in the UN, the Muslim Brotherhood prepared itself for an armed liberation struggle against the British and Zionists. Meanwhile, the parent organization provided military training in Egypt for Arab volunteers who wanted to fight for Palestine, organized weapons, and sent fighters into the Mandate territory. Muslim Brotherhood fighters played an important role in the defense of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Faluja near Gaza against the Zionist troops in the first months of the war.¹²

»The Muslim Brotherhood was held in high esteem by Palestinians of all political persuasions because of its commitment to Palestine. Unlike the Arab governments, they did not stop at words, but translated their support into action, first from 1936 to 1937, but above all during the war in 1948.«¹³

After the Nakba, the Brotherhood developed differently in the West Bank annexed by Jordan on the one hand, and in the Egyptian‐administered Gaza Strip on the other. In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood pandered to the local monarchy and thus ultimately to Western imperialism; it gave up armed resistance against Zionism, was kept on a short leash by the king, served as competition against Arab nationalism and the socialist labor movement, and limited itself to the role of a sham opposition when it occasionally called for criticism of Amman’s pro‐Zionist foreign policy or demanded a stricter religious‐normative domestic policy. In this role, the Muslim Brotherhood became increasingly unpopular, especially among Palestinians in the West Bank and Jordan. Its base consisted of »merchants and landlords«. »In contrast to Egypt, employees and freelancers were hardly represented […] Pupils, students and teachers were also underrepresented.«¹⁴

In Gaza, on the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood consisted mainly of pupils, students and employees, which, together with the connection to Egypt (from 1953) under Abdel Nasser, may have had an influence on the more radical character of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip. Among the Muslim Brothers who studied in Egypt were Khalil al‐Wazir (Abu Jihad), Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Assad Saftawi, Yussef al‐Najjar, Kamal Adwan and — depending on the interpretation — Yasser Arafat¹⁵, who later went on to become a founder and one of the most important leaders of Fatah.¹⁶

While Fatah (not as the only, but as the most important organization) won over to the armed struggle those — mostly young — Palestinians who demanded radical solutions, the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, as in the West Bank, distanced itself from the liberation struggle and thus also increasingly lost its appeal. This policy was continued by the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank as well as in the Gaza Strip, which reunited organizationally from 1967. In the 20 years leading up to the founding of Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood initially concentrated on building mosques and then social institutions in order to expand its influence among the population. Due to this non‐confrontational policy towards the occupation, the Muslim Brotherhood was viewed very favorably by the Zionist regime as a competitor to the PLO, and was treated accordingly.¹⁷ (See Myth 1)

c) Hamas (1987 until today)

This changed at the very latest with the rise of the »Islamic Resistance Movement« (acronym: HAMAS) from the end of the 1980s and the rapprochement between the Fatah and PLO leadership on the one hand and Israel on the other: Hamas was founded immediately after the outbreak of the First Intifada in December 1987. It took an active part in this popular uprising and was one of the fiercest critics of the so‐called Oslo peace negotiations in the 1990s. From 1989¹⁸ onwards, it waged an armed struggle against the Zionist regime, and in the Second Intifada between 2000 and 2005, it was the leading military force behind the uprising, together with the Al‐Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which are close to Fatah.

In 2006, Hamas won the parliamentary elections in the territories occupied in 1967 by a landslide, but was unable to form a stable government due to Israel and the West’s isolationist policies along with Fatah’s blockade. In June 2007, Hamas staged a putsch in the Gaza Strip, whilst Fatah took control of the West Bank. (See Myth 10) Since then, Gaza has been the most important bastion of Palestinian resistance, while the West Bank has remained dominated by the Israeli military and their puppet regime under Mahmoud Abbas.

Israel has waged five wars to date (2008/09, 2012, 2014, 2021 and 2023) to weaken or completely destroy Hamas. In the decade and a half or so that the organization has been in power in the Gaza Strip, it has lost its impeccable reputation for avoiding corruption and power politics but has nonetheless established itself as a leading force in the Palestinian resistance. It has both tried to make peace with Abbas and abandoned its staunch refusal to recognize Israel. (Myths 9 and 11) It has also made several U‑turns on foreign policy, particularly in relation to Syria. (Myth 13) Hamas is currently the undisputed leader of the Palestinian liberation movement: it governs Gaza, leads the resistance there, is by far the strongest resistance force militarily and, in its role as such, enjoys great support not only in Gaza, but also in the West Bank and amongst the diaspora, which is reflected not least in the election victories at universities in the West Bank.

3. Myths about Hamas

Some of the myths surrounding Hamas have already been touched on in the previous chapter. In the following, however, they will be explicitly adumbrated and refuted. These are the claims that one encounters most frequently, especially among people who are generally pro‐Palestinian. The full list of all myths about Hamas would, of course, be much longer.

Myth 1: »Hamas was created by Israel.«

In the past, some Israeli army circles and the US media have claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Gaza was »financed by Israel as a counterweight against the PLO and the communists« in the years 1967 – 75, i.e. when it was mainly focused on building mosques.¹⁹ Helga Baumgarten writes: »Palestinian Muslim Brothers categorically deny that they ever received financial aid from Israel. What […] cannot be denied, however, is the occupying power’s very lenient and open approach to all Muslim Brotherhood activities« at the time.²⁰

In her estimation: »Israeli policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood can therefore probably best be characterized as a policy of friendly tolerance, although it cannot be ruled out that there were also cases of direct support.«²¹ Similarly, Jean‐Pierre Filiu writes about this period: »The occupying power did not go so far as to give official sanction to the [Muslim Brotherhood], but instead opted for a benevolent — but by definition reversible — tolerance.«²² Alexander Flores further contends that

»Hamas is not a creature of Israel, as is sometimes claimed. However, the Israeli occupation policy has created the conditions that have helped Hamas to achieve its current stature in two respects. It has allowed the organization, or rather its predecessor, to flourish when its competitors were severely oppressed; and it nurtured such hatred of the occupation through the continued constraint and oppression of Palestinian society and the violent and contemptuous treatment of the population«.²³

A break with the old line

As early as the 1950s, young ex‐Muslim Brothers who were dissatisfied with the passive attitude of the MB had contributed to the founding of Fatah as a Palestinian liberation and guerrilla organization. (See Chapter 3.b.) In the early 1980s, the phenomenon repeated itself to some extent with the founding of Islamic Jihad, which was inspired by the Iranian revolution. Although Islamic Jihad was considerably smaller and less influential than Fatah, unlike Fatah it also adhered to an Islamic ideology and thus became a competitor to the Muslim Brotherhood in this field. Hamas therefore found itself in a situation where, on the one hand, it had a solid base, particularly in the Gaza Strip, but on the other its legitimacy as a Palestinian political force was called into question. The outbreak of the First Intifada was the straw that broke the camel’s back, and served as the midwife of Hamas, which emerged from the political center and the already existing armed and secret service structures of the Muslim Brotherhood around a week after the start of the popular uprising.²⁴

Glenn Robinson and Diaa Rashwan speak of an internal »coup«²⁵ or a kind of revolt with regard to the change of course and the founding of Hamas.²⁶ Raif Hussein, on the other hand, considers these interpretations to be »exaggerated«, as the MB leadership supported the decision.²⁷ Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the founding of Hamas marked a clear turnaround in the Muslim Brotherhood ’s previous policy in Palestine. However, this should not be seen as an overnight event. Rather, parts of the Muslim Brotherhood around Shaykh Yassin had been preparing for this step since the mid‐1980s, for example by stockpiling weapons and building up underground structures.²⁸

»Honeymoon«?

Baumgarten writes about the Zionist occupying power’s restraint towards Hamas in the first months of its existence:

»In the entire period from the beginning of the [First] Intifada until the early summer of 1988, the Israeli army allowed Hamas, in contrast to the PLO organizations, to operate more or less freely. As all the analyses presented confirm, Hamas strike appeals were not violently suppressed, Hamas leaflets could be distributed largely unhindered, and there were apparently relatively few arrests. At the beginning of the Intifada, only Dr. Abd el‐Aziz Rantisi and Sheikh Khalil al‐Quqa were arrested in Gaza. Only al‐Quqa was ultimately deported on April 11. A total of 32 Palestinians were deported in the first year of the Intifada, the majority of them members of the nationalist PLO organizations. The first major wave of arrests against Hamas began in the late summer of 1988, after […] the Israeli army discovered the existence of armed Hamas cells. With the exception of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, all Hamas leaders in Gaza were arrested. […] As a result of the arrests, the Hamas leadership headquarters moved to Israeli prisons. Ibrahim Yazuri […] was arrested on October 12, 1988, followed in May 1989 by Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, together with Ismail Abu Shanab, also from the Islamist leadership, and another 250 Hamas activists. By this time at the very latest, it had become clear that the honeymoon between Israel and the Palestinian Islamists was over.«²⁹

The attentive reader will have noticed that the term »honeymoon« is actually a very inappropriate metaphor because a honeymoon follows a wedding. However, Baumgarten is actually describing the opposite, namely a kind of divorce: after Hamas was founded, there was a brief period in which the Zionist regime had not yet understood that the MB in Palestine had transformed itself from a quietist into a resistance organization. From 1989, however, Hamas has been officially considered a »terrorist organization« in Israel, and membership alone has since become enough to be imprisoned for many years.³⁰ As a result of this repression, Hamas fell into an existential crisis shortly after its founding, i.e. in 1989, and by 1992 at the latest.³¹

Conclusion

To begin with the Muslim Brotherhood: as far as I know, there are certain indications, but no evidence, that it has received direct support from Israel; in my view, however, this point is of secondary importance. The toleration or even direct or indirect support of the Muslim Brotherhood by Israel was based on two grounds³²: 1. divide and rule — and this can hardly be blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood, as Baumgarten also emphasizes.³³ 2. This support was essentially based on the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood did not resist the colonial regime — this in turn can and must be held against it. But the founding of Hamas was precisely a radical break with this earlier policy, which had served the Zionists.³⁴

This was also evident within a very short time, when Israel initiated a policy of massive repression against the Hamas leadership. In light of this, as well as the fact that torture during interrogations of (suspected) Hamas members quickly became part of the standard repertoire of the IOF and Shin Bet, Baumgarten concludes: »All of this undoubtedly reduces to absurdity attacks by the Palestinian left against the Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas that they are collaborators with the occupation.«³⁵ Filiu also describes the portrayal of the Muslim Brotherhood or even Hamas as »tools of Israel« as a »caricature«.³⁶

One must simply step back and survey the past decade and a half blockade, punctuated by five wars of aggression which the Zionists have waged on the Gaza strip, all of which have served and continue to serve the goal of destroying Hamas. When one does so, the re‐laundering of these frivolous allegations of cooperation between Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood and Israel 40, 50, or 60 years ago reveal themselves as simply and patently absurd. But then again, there are those who claim that the Taliban are still the same US puppets in 2021 that they were in the 1990s. In the end, it has become a sort of article of faith, and at issue is whether one is willing to question it: Do I believe that relationships can change or not? Do I believe that there is some kind of »original sin« that cannot be washed away? Do I believe that Western imperialism or Zionism are all‐powerful and control everything and everyone, regardless of the facts on the table?

For the present author the matter is really quite clear: the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine had become a tame movement from the 1950s at the latest, which therefore enjoyed a certain benevolence from the Zionists and was even pragmatically supported in the spirit of a divide‐and‐rule policy. Hamas marked the end of this relationship and became the bitter, mortal enemy of Zionism as a result of Oslo and the Second Intifada.

Myth 2: Hamas is a »radical Islamist« or »fundamentalist« organization.

Let’s start with the terms at issue here themselves:

a) Fundamentalism

The term »fundamentalism« comes from a Christian context and refers to Protestant movements that wanted to return to the idealistic or literary foundations of Christianity, i.e. to the Bible, which they seek to interpret literally. The most prominent Christian fundamentalists are the so‐called Evangelicals. Since Catholics have an intermediate authority in the interpretation of the Bible in the form of the Church, fundamentalist currents have had a much harder time taking root there.³⁷ The same applies to Shiite Islam, which despite lacking a church in the catholic sense has an established clergy.³⁸

Sunni Islam, on the other hand, knows neither one nor the other and is therefore closer to Protestantism. It is similar to Protestantism in that it has a more open flank towards fundamentalism, which in its case primarily tends to mean the literal interpretation of the Koran. There have always been fundamentalist renewal movements in Islam that have questioned orthodoxy in the form of the so‐called schools of law (madhahib), the traditional religious scholars (ulama’) and even the traditions handed down (sunnah) and the traditions of the Prophet and his companions (ahadith).³⁹

b) Salafiyya

Similar to Protestant fundamentalism, these movements have not had an invariably reactionary character: in the USA, for example, many Evangelicals early condemned slavery as a »diabolical sin.«⁴⁰ Likewise, progressive reformers such as Jamal ad‐Din al‐Afghani (1838 – 97) or Muhammad Abdu (1849 – 1905) advocated against conservative orthodoxy and colonialism, and in favor of bourgeois democracy, scientific progress, and rationalism — referring to early Islam as the time of the »righteous ancestors«, or in Arabic: as‐Salaf as‐Salih.⁴¹

c) »Salafism,« »Jihadism« and Wahhabism

Derived from the above, the term »Salafis« in use today usually refers to much more conservative currents in Sunnism, which can also be described as fundamentalist. In their case, this fundamentalism has little that is progressive about it: the anti‐colonialism and anti‐imperialism is primarily cultural, often explicitly apolitical (not praying and fighting, but praying instead of fighting), and thus does not outweigh the conservatism in other issues. In general, these »Salafis« hardly differ from the Saudi Wahhabis. Admittedly, the former often reject the latter for their pact with the Saud monarchy. At the same time, however, they themselves are frequently financed by Saudi Arabia.⁴²

Where »Salafism« does make a political appearance, it usually only attempts to impose its conservatism on society as a whole via the state. So‐called »jihadism« à la Al‐Qaeda or ISIS is initially the continuation of this policy by other means. However, the rise of IS in Syria and Iraq, and even more so since its downfall, has shown that this »jihadism« is particularly attractive for militias to legitimize themselves and recruit fighters (also internationally) in the context of territorial and mostly ethnically and/or religiously charged sovereignty conflicts or civil wars. In addition to Iraq and Syria, this is also the case in Afghanistan, Yemen, North Africa and the Sahel region.

d) Hamas: An Islamic‐conservative national liberation movement

Hamas is neither »Salafi«, nor Wahhabi, nor »jihadist«, nor apolitical. And it is not fundamentalist either. There are »Salafis« in its ranks, but they are comparatively insignificant.⁴³ It would also be strange if they did not exist within Hamas, as it is both a popular movement and an Islamic party, bringing together various Islamic currents. As explained above, it descended from the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is not fundamentalist either; on the contrary, it is relatively pluralistic: its offshoots or subsidiary parties in the various countries are — as mentioned above in section 3 — relatively diverse. In Tunisia they are considered comparatively »liberal«⁴⁴ in Jordan they are still a lapdog of the royal family⁴⁵ in Yemen they are atypically quite strongly »Salafi« and are even supported by the Saudis (despite the Saudis and the Muslim Brotherhood being arch‐enemies almost everywhere else),⁴⁶ in Syria they have been strongly influenced by their experiences of repression since the 1970s⁴⁷ and in Egypt, their country of origin, their behavior has ranged from militantly oppositional, to collaborative, to peacefully oppositional,⁴⁸ depending on the policies of the current regime. They were largely shattered after General al-Sisi’s coup and have disintegrated into either »pacified« and apathetic factions on the one hand, or radicalized factions on the other.

As outlined above, they all have a religious‐conservative political program, which generally provides for a form of bourgeois democracy and relatively liberal capitalism. Their respective nation comes first, followed by the (pan-)Arab nation, and finally the Muslim Ummah. How »conservative« or »liberal«, how »democratic« or »theocratic« the respective Muslim Brotherhood may be positioned depends on the national circumstances, the repression affecting it, and the class interests of its base.

Hamas is no exception in this sense: its ideological program is adapted to the conditions in Palestine, i.e. specifically to the national liberation struggle, which is in the interests of all Palestinian classes. Because Hamas, as a petty‐bourgeois party and movement, relies on precisely these masses — small business owners, teachers, doctors, scientists, lawyers, engineers, workers, farmers and the national bourgeoisie — it also tries to represent their interests as best it can –within its ideological framework, of course. But this framework is much broader than one might expect from buzzwords such as »Islamism« and »fundamentalism«, which are imbued with Eurocentric schematism, idealism and prejudice: Hamas has long since ceased to conceive of its struggle as a religious one; it derives its (fighting) morality from religion, but it knows that the war in Palestine is not a war between religions. (See Myth 3) Even its language had already become »secularized« by the mid‐2000s⁴⁹ and anyone reading today’s publications by Hamas or the Qassam Brigades will find that they argue less theologically and much more morally and in terms of international law. Insofar, then, as Hamas’s rule in Gaza might be described as authoritarian, it is not so out of any sort of conviction that it must enforce particularly strict religiously based moral rules (though there have certainly been such attempts, they have all been modified or abandoned altogether, not least due to the resistant or disobedience of the population)⁵⁰; Hamas itself rejects the charge that it is imposing a moral policy on the population.⁵¹ Rather, Hamas’s supposed authoritarianism can only be understood as the inevitable conditions of rule for a government of a besieged area threatened by an overwhelming enemy.

e) »Khamas‐IS«?

Unlike IS and its various offshoots, Hamas is not a civil war militia that lives from hand to mouth or from conquest and acquisition rather than advocating a genuine political program. Hamas is a sustainable political party and movement with strong roots in the popular masses, which, due to the specific situation in Palestine, maintains a military arm that is part of the guerrillas of the Palestinian independence movement and at the same time, to a certain extent, constitutes Gaza’s army. Unlike IS, Hamas does not seek the violent destruction of the existing nation states and the establishment of a worldwide caliphate, nor does it pursue a sectarian or eliminationist course against any ethnic group in the region because it belongs to the wrong religion (Jews, Christians, Druze or, in relation to Iraq, Yezidis or similar) or denomination (Shiites or Alawites, which do not exist in Palestine anyway). (See also Myth 3.) Hamas has also never distinguished itself with particularly brutal murders or even celebrated them on camera. On the contrary: martyrs are honored, the killing of enemies in battle is celebrated and the enemy is of course also mocked– but they do not make, let alone circulate, footage of mass executions of Israelis.

The Zionist propaganda apparatus and the Western imperialist lying press have widely reported that Hamas itself documented and disseminated its »massacres« and »acts of terror« on October 7. But I myself only know of great footages showing freedom fighters flattening military targets, taking prisoners etc., and a people blowing up their prison walls and cheering their guerrillas. A fact check article by Occupied News does say: »Some video footage shows Hamas fighters shooting and/or executing adult non‐combatants — usually while trying to escape capture. It is worth noting that in at least one such video, the clear voices of other fighters can be heard shouting »NO!« and »Why?«. In another video, a Hamas fighter can be seen stopping a Palestinian in civilian clothes from humiliating a killed Israeli.«⁵² Unfortunately, the relevant sources are not linked. (More on the »Al‐Aqsa flood« under Myth 15)

Finally, it should be mentioned that Hamas has repeatedly taken action against »jihadist« cells in the Gaza Strip in the past: in 2009, a group close to Al‐Qaeda was smashed.⁵³ In 2011, the security forces in Gaza killed more »jihadists«⁵⁴ In the following years, IS and Al‐Qaeda supporters were repeatedly arrested in the Gaza Strip⁵⁵ and in some cases also killed by the authorities.⁵⁶ Conversely, Daesh officially declared war on Hamas⁵⁷ Israel on the other hand treated more than 1,000 Syrian insurgent fighters in 2014, presumably including quite a few fighters from the Al‐Nusra Front, the Syrian Al‐Qaeda offshoot, in hospitals in the Golan, which has been occupied since 1967.⁵⁸

f) Wing battles within Hamas

Hamas is no more monolithic than it is »fundamentalist« or »radical Islamic«. There are various currents that vie for influence within it, which is particularly noticeable in its foreign policy orientation. In this regard, Abdelrahman Nassar speaks of three relevant poles that are currently vying for hegemony within Hamas: One around the former Hamas leader Khaled Mash’al, which could perhaps be described as the »Muslim Brother pole«; a Salafi confessionalist or sectarian pole, which is, however, comparatively without influence; and a »military wing« made up of Qassam Brigades and other leadership figures who advocate a rapprochement with the »Axis of Resistance.«⁵⁹ (On all this, see Myth 13) These currents or wings can be identified on the basis of the aforementioned positions on this specific issue and do not necessarily say anything about the political positions of the actors on other issues.

Leila Seurat also comments on this fact: These divergences cannot be understood by merely looking at normative categories opposing a ’radical’ outside leadership to a ’moderate’ one within,« as is often done in the literature. Before 2011, it was the exiled leadership that rejected any compromise with the Palestinian Authority; after 2011, it was willing to do so, but the leadership in Gaza resisted; the former has since pursued a »Sunni internationalist« course, the latter a nationalist and anti‐sectarian one. Seurat therefore states: »there is no strict overlap between geographical and ideological divide.«⁶⁰ Phrases such as »hardliners«, as we all too often hear in the Western press with regard to this or that Hamas politician, are even less helpful.

In general, let’s always try to be as specific as possible and use as few labels as possible!

Myth 3: »Hamas is anti‐Semitic.«

a) Definition of anti‐Semitism

Here we must first define what antisemitism actually means. If one follows the IHRA’s definition, as the authorities in Germany do, or even the so‐called 3‑D test, then ultimately any criticism of Israel is anti‐Semitic. That is precisely the point of these baseless definitions, which have nothing to do with science and everything to do with propaganda in the sense of Zionism and Western imperialism. It is similar to the idea that anti‐Semitism is an isolated ideology and has nothing to do with racism; this idea originates from Moshe Postone, was adopted by the so‐called »anti‐Germans« (Zionist, generally white ethnically German pseudo‐leftists) and can be found today in mainstream German media discourse, at universities, etc.⁶¹

Anti‐Semitism can only be meaningfully defined as racism against Jews as Jews or because they are labeled as Jews. Like every form of racism, anti‐Semitism has various specific characteristics, has its own history — which in its case is closely linked to Christian anti‐Judaism — and is adaptable to the current interests of the racists, etc. And like all racism, it is not just about ideology, about prejudice and hatred or about direct, individual violence, but in particular about a power relationship, about structural and systematic violence, etc.⁶² This means that racism in its fullest sense is not reciprocal, but one‐sided. In a nutshell, this means that in the world as we know it, with its history, its reality, etc., there is no racism of blacks against whites, but only vice versa; there is no racism of Jews against Germans, but only vice versa, etc. And when a black person says: »Fucking white people« it is something completely different from when a white person says: « Fucking black people« et cetera.

b) Hostility towards Jews in the context of Palestine

For Palestine, this means that when a Palestinian says: »Fucking Jews«, this is firstly something completely different from when an Israeli says: »Fucking Palestinians« or »Fucking Arabs«. And secondly, it is also completely different from a German saying: »Fucking Jews«. Because in Palestine, the real history and present are completely different from that in Germany, especially from the years 1933 – 45: while in Europe and especially in Nazi Germany Jews were an oppressed and persecuted minority, in Palestine it is the Zionist settlers who oppressed, expelled and murdered the Palestinians. In addition, these settlers were not only Jews according to their self‐image, but as Zionists they also claim to act in the interests and on behalf of all Jews worldwide.

This means 1. that the Palestinians are actually fighting against people who confront them as Jews; when Palestinians therefore speak of »the Jews«, this corresponds to a certain extent to reality. In the ears of many Germans, the phrase »the Jews« arouses unease because of our own history. However, we must distance ourselves from this German perspective when it comes to Palestine or the Middle East, because ultimately this phrase is just as generalizing, but also just as understandable and ultimately just as little the true core of real problems as when people talk about »the Germans«, »the Americans«, »the Chinese«, »the Palestinians« etc. in everyday life. Everyday language and consciousness do not usually constitute precise political analyses.

2. Some German discourse goes so far as to suggest that any action against a Jewish person is anti‐Semitic, especially if it is violent. The Palestinians, however, are actually fighting against people who are generally Jewish, but only »coincidentally« insofar as it is not the Palestinians who declare them enemies because they are Jewish. On the contrary, it is the Zionists who feel empowered to attack, oppress and expel the Palestinians on the basis of their Jewishness. It is not the Palestinians’ fault that their oppressors are Jews and of course they have the right to defend themselves against them. Moreover, as I said, an act can only be understood as anti‐Semitic if it is directed against a Jewish person solely because he is Jewish, and not because he happens to be Jewish.

3. If the Zionists and the settlers in Palestine are equated with Judaism as a whole, this is of course incorrect and quite dangerous. However, the blame for this does not lie with any specific anti‐Semitism among Palestinians, Arabs or Muslims, but is conversely the result of Zionist propaganda: for it is the Zionists who have equated Judaism with Zionism, Zionists and settlers with Jews per se. Western propaganda follows them in this — and gets entangled in open contradictions: for example, the ruling elite in Germany likes to declare that it is anti‐Semitic to equate Israel and Judaism (which is correct), only to defame any criticism of Israel as anti‐Semitic in the next breath. In short: Zionists and anti‐Semites agree in equating Israel and Judaism (and not only in this, by the way).

It is absolutely cynical when the victims of Zionism, i.e. the Palestinians and ultimately the Arabs as a whole, are accused of anti‐Semitism for parroting this lie of the Zionists and Western imperialism! In reality, at different times, different parts of the population in the Arab world equated Judaism and Zionism to a greater or lesser extent. According to Gudrun Krämer, until 1948 »only a few Arab journalists, writers and political activists distinguished between Jews and Zionists; the left was the most likely to do so, and even they were not consistent. The majority spoke of Jews, even if they only meant the Zionists.« She also refers to the fact that the Zionists themselves blurred this distinction in terms of language and content.⁶³ Moreover, this lack of differentiation was always due to the position of weakness and oppression in which the Palestinians and the Arab world have permanently found themselves vis‐à‐vis Israel since 1947 at the latest.

This situation also explains why conspiracy myths are so virulent, especially in relation to Zionism. Zionists and pseudo‐anti‐Semite hunters — unsurpassably Eurocentric and ignorant as ever — simply see this as a typical characteristic of European anti‐Semitism. It is true that elements of European anti‐Judaism and anti‐Semitism can also be found in the Arab and Muslim world. But on the one hand, one has to prove very concretely to what extent these are actually anti‐Semitic exports and not superficial (supposed) similarities that are then reinterpreted (for example, when the slogan »child murderer Israel« is presented as a new edition of the ritual murder legend from the Christian‐European Middle Ages). And secondly, these elements also take on a different character in the context of Zionist colonialism and the real balance of power.

Alexander Flores writes: »It is no coincidence that from Europe it is not so much the racial idea of anti‐Semitism as its conspiracy theory elements […] that have been accepted in the Arab context. Many Palestinians and other Arabs were only able to explain the fact that the […] Jews were now strengthened by massive immigration and were able to establish themselves as a dominant group, even founding their own state and gaining the support of the leading powers — first Great Britain, then the USA — with the help of conspiracy theories.«⁶⁴ Of course, this does not change the fact that such conspiracy‐mystical thinking must be combated. However, this is mainly because, as Helga Baumgarten writes, it is an »oversized […] magnification of the enemy«,⁶⁵ which ultimately encourages passivity, since — we all know this argument — »nothing can be changed anyway«. However, this fight against false consciousness, against defeatist argumentation supports, against reductions and prejudices is completely different from the fight against a racist relationship of domination.

It is also clear that anti‐Jewish and anti‐Semitic elements in legitimate anti‐Zionism must also be combated in the interests of protecting Jews and on the basis of an anti‐racist and »enlightenment« principles. However, it must be emphasized: Hostility towards Jews among Palestinians and Arabs and ultimately also among Muslims worldwide is first and foremost the result of Zionist crimes and propaganda. Only when Zionism is defeated will the real breeding ground for this hostility disappear. This is not the only reason why overcoming Zionism is in the interests of Jews worldwide.

c) Jews and hostility towards Jews in the Arab world

From the emergence of Islam until the 20th century, there was no hostility towards Jews in the Muslim‐majority countries that even came close to what we know from Europe: no ghettos, no pogroms, no racism. Jews, like all religious minorities, were sometimes more and sometimes less disadvantaged.⁶⁶ But as Kai Hafez rightly notes: »There can hardly be any dispute that Jews have been able to live far more safely in the Muslim world than in Europe for the last two thousand years. While the motif of the »Christ‐killers« had a long‐lasting effect in the Christian world, Judaism is explicitly recognized as a religion of the book (ahl al‐kitab) in the Koran.«⁶⁷ Under Muslim rule, Judaism experienced several phases of prosperity, such as in Spanish Andalusia. Even a staunch Zionist and neo‐conservative like the historian Bernhard Lewis speaks of a »Jewish‐Islamic tradition« that only broke down in the 20th century.⁶⁸

Anti‐Semitic ideology came from Europe to the Arab world at the end of the 19th century, i.e. as a colonial export. The first translations of European anti‐Semitic pamphlets usually came from Arab Christians.⁶⁹ In view of Zionist colonization and Britain’s open support for this project, European anti‐Semitic motifs fell on fertile ground in Palestine at the beginning of the Mandate period. Therefore, as Flores writes, »anti‐Jewish statements were alreadymade by Palestinians in the early Mandate period; over the course of the Mandate they became more frequent. But they only came from some Palestinians; even less so from the other Arabs — with a few exceptions, their coexistence with the Jews there remained undisturbed during the Mandate period. It was only in the wake of the founding of the state of Israel, the first Arab‐Israeli war and the resulting catastrophe for the Palestinians that a sharply anti‐Israeli and often anti‐Semitic attitude spread in the Arab world.«⁷⁰

The reasons for the lack of differentiation between Jews and Zionists by the victims of Zionism have already been discussed above. Here again in the words of Flores:

»1. the intensity of the damage caused by Zionism and the founding of the state of Israel, which drives its victims to use a shrill tone, exaggerations and generalizations; 2. the persistence of thinking in communitarian categories (»the Jews«) when describing political developments and the resulting neglect of differentiation within the communities; 3. The vehement claim of the Zionists or the Israeli leadership to speak and act for all Jews worldwide and their far‐reaching success in marginalizing all non‐ or anti‐Zionist Jewish voices. This has blurred the distinction between Zionism and Judaism in much of the public perception; 4. the way in which the Zionist project, or Israel, was and is embedded in world politics. The Zionist movement has always understood how to present itself as an outpost of the leading world powers in the confrontation with its opponents and has thus won their support. The success of Zionism […] would have been unthinkable without them. And this support appears to be very stable: Israel can afford even the most outrageous war crimes and human rights violations without anyone falling into its arms. Many Palestinians and Arabs can only imagine this enormous success story as the result of a great conspiracy in which, moreover (see the third reason just mentioned!), Jews all over the world play a major role. All these factors lead to a blurring of the distinction between Zionism and Judaism in the eyes of many Arabs, and their fierce hostility towards Israel turns into anti‐Semitism. In this process, all possible sources are used to illustrate the hostility towards Jews that has arisen in this way, above all a whole series of set pieces from anti‐Semitism of European provenance, whereby it is noticeable that it is less the racist aspects of this that are reproduced than the fantasies of a Jewish world conspiracy.«⁷¹

d) Hamas and hostility towards Jews

Having said all this, we now come to Hamas.

Anti‐Jewish statements can be found in the early publications of Hamas and above all in the notorious charter of 1988, the significance of which has been greatly exaggerated in the West (Myth 12). In line with Flores’ analysis, these are based on conspiracy theory and by no means on racism.⁷² Moreover, as Hafez emphasizes⁷³, there is no eliminationist element towards Jews in it; not even the »annihilation« or »destruction« of Israel has ever been mentioned in any Hamas publication, but always only the »liberation of (all of) Palestine«⁷⁴. In addition to the conspiracy myths, from which Hamas has long distanced itself⁷⁵ and of which nothing can be found in its publications today, what remains above all is the religious interpretation of the Palestinian conflict and the lack of distinction between Zionists and Jews.

As explained in Myth 2, Hamas’ political discourse had already become strongly »secularized« by the time of its election victory in 2006. The same applies to its differentiation between Judaism and Zionism, although the first efforts in this direction can be seen as early as 1990.⁷⁶

The new policy paper from 2017 (Myth 12) makes a correspondingly consistent distinction. Point 16 states: »Hamas affirms that its conflict is with the Zionist project and not with the Jews because of their religion. Hamas is not fighting against the Jews because they are Jews, but against the Zionists who occupy Palestine. However, it is the Zionists who constantly identify Judaism and the Jews with their own colonial project and their illegal entity.« In point 17, it declares: »Hamas rejects the persecution of any human being or the undermining of their rights for nationalist, religious or sectarian reasons.« It goes on to criticize the European anti‐Semitic tradition, which it also distances itself from by stating that it is »not connected to the history of Arabs and Muslims or their heritage.« Finally, it defines Zionism as a form of settler colonialism that has already existed in other parts of the world.⁷⁷

Anyone who regularly reads publications by Hamas and the Qassam Brigades will find it confirmed that they consistently refer to »Zionists« and »settlers«, but not to Jews or a religious conflict. This settler colonialism discourse is now largely a consensus among the resistance groups: all organizations from Hamas and Jihad to the Lion’s Den (Areen al‐Usud) to the PFLP and DFLP use these terms and this analysis.

It can of course be assumed that these organizations are more reflective as political actors than the masses: Khaled Hroub points out that Hamas and its leadership differentiate much more consciously between Jews and Zionists than is the case among its supporters or the ordinary Palestinian population. As discussed above under section b), he also argues that while the interchangeable use of such terms in »common parlance« might be »regrettably imprecise,« »in the face of the ongoing presence of an aggressive, illegal and non‐Palestinian occupier, which whatever distinctions are made is identifiable Jewish (Zionist/Israeli)« it is absolutely secondary — which is not to say, as he does, »irrelevant.«⁷⁸ Hroub summarizes:

»Although in the early years of its inception Hamas made little effort to differentiate between Judaism as a religion and Zionism as a political movement, in later and recent years Hamas has completely clarified its thinking on this issue. It is anti‐Zionist, not anti‐Jew.«⁷⁹

e) Historical comparisons

Finally, it should be pointed out that the practice of Hamas (and all other resistance groups) of placing the Zionists in the tradition of the Nazis should not be seen as anti‐Semitic or as relativizing the Holocaust, as Israel lobbyists and German Zionists actually like to do. On the contrary, a completely different interpretation is much closer — because in such comparisons the persecution of the European Jews is precisely not denied, but taken seriously as a crime against humanity. In the second step, the Palestinians identify with these persecuted Jews — even though some of them have become their own oppressors in the real present. There is nothing presumptuous about this, it is rather an anti‐sectarian, internationalist act that simultaneously liberates Jewish history from the real Zionist presumption. This can also be seen in the following example: In April 2008, two years after the start of the blockade on Gaza, the high‐ranking Hamas spokesman Mahmud al‐Zahar declared in an interview: »Sixty‐five years ago, the courageous Jews of the Warsaw ghetto rose in defense of their people. We Gazans, living in the World’s largest open‐air prison, can do no less.«⁸⁰ A leader of a Palestinian resistance organization here elevates the anti‐fascist resistance of European Jews to a role model for his own people. A magnificent, honorable gesture!

Myth 4: »Hamas is fascist.«

This accusation is made by a whole range of »critics«: from openly right‐wing radical Islam‐haters to pseudo‐left »Islam critics« all the way to the Maoist MLPD (Marxist‐Leninist Party of Germany). Since the bourgeoisie have no meaningful concept of fascism, the accusation from this side will not be addressed here; it is purely a fighting term and is only used to supplement the accusation of »fundamentalism« and »Islamism« (Myth 2) with another bad word.

Marxists, on the other hand, should meet the requirement of not using the term fascism in an inflationary or moralistic way, but in a scientific and well‐founded way. Whether this is the case in relation to Hamas will be examined below. As examples, two actors from the German radical left who have a Marxist self‐image are examined here: the MLPD and Kommunistische Aufbau KA (Communist Construction).

MLPD

The MLPD is the left‐wing force that most vehemently raises the accusation of fascism against Hamas. It even publicly demanded a ban on the organization, in a situation in which the Ministry of the Interior had already announced exactly that. The MLPD did not even hesitate to accuse the German state of not having taken tougher action against Hamas earlier: »It is scandalous that the government has tolerated their activities for years.«⁸¹

Since October 7, the MLPD has published countless statements and articles on its website and in its organ, the Rote Fahne, in which Hamas (just like Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah) is always described as »fascist«, sometimes also as »Islamic‐fascist«. (By the way: in contrast, Netanyahu only earns the attribute »fascistoid« from the MLPD.⁸²) Let us now look at how the MLPD »proves« the »fascist character« of Hamas.

In fact, the MLPD has only published a single text in which it justifies why Hamas is fascist in its view.⁸³ This was published on October 26, 2023, i.e. at a time when the party had not only long been trumpeting its assessment of the Islamic Resistance Movement as »fascist« to the world, but had also backed the German government’s announced ban on Hamas. It is of course possible that the members have already been given an internal argument; however, the MLPD has not previously justified its defamation of Hamas to the outside world. I do not want to mince my words here: This pamphlet from October 26 is so absurdly bad and stupid that I have seriously considered deleting the entire myth. The MLPD bases its »argumentation« solely on the Hamas Charter of 1988, doing the same thing that only Zionists, Islam‐haters, neoconservatives and other right‐wingers do in their anti‐Hamas propaganda. This document never had the significance ascribed to it in the West and is long outdated. (Myth 12) This has already disqualified the whole paper and we could end the criticism here.

Nevertheless, one or two passages should be quoted here so that readers can convince themselves of the inadequacy of the MLPD’s argumentation without having to read the whole document themselves. I will follow the assertions in the text in order:

»Hamas is deeply racist«, we learn there. Why? Because they supposedly claim that »Palestine in its entirety is ›bequeathed‹ to ›all generations of Muslims‹.« Note that the phrase »in its entirety« is not actually a quote from the charter, but comes from the MLPD itself. Presumably they are trying to summarize the Islamic concept of Waqf (endowment), which Palestine is described as in the Hamas Charter. Whatever this has to do with racism, however, we are not told.

Furthermore, the MLPD claims that Hamas »essentially reject[s] the political struggle for national and social liberation«. Let’s leave aside the struggle for social liberation for a moment (see myths 7, 8 and 14): The MLPD »substantiates« the claim that Hamas would not fight for national liberation with the following sentence from the Charter: »It is imperative to anchor in the minds of the coming Muslim generations the idea that the Palestinian question is a religious question.« (Article 15) Again, the question arises as to why this should be evidence of a »fascist character,« but oh well. Nevertheless, the MLPD’s assertion is countered by the fact that patriotism and the struggle for national liberation can have different ideological foundations, as well as religious and moral ones. In Article 12, the Hamas Charter itself states precisely this fact: »While other nationalisms consist of material, human, and territorial considerations, the nationality of Hamas also carries, in addition to all those, the all important divine factors which lend to it its spirit and life.«⁸⁴

Further on in the text, the pronounce Hamas »fascist‐misogynistic.« Finally here they at least provide a solid quotation, taking the following from the charter: »the Muslim women have a no lesser role than that of men in the war of liberation; they manufacture men and play a great role in guiding and educating the [new] generation.« From this, they conclude that »according to Hamas’ ideology, however, the role of women relates purely to the family sphere. Here she is supposed to bear children and indoctrinate them according to the fascist ideology — and be subservient to the Islamic [sic!] man.« Okay, Hamas’ view of the family is obviously patriarchal‐conservative, but is that synonymous with fascist? The only »fascist« thing cited here is the ideology of Hamas, with which the children are to be »indoctrinated«. However, up to this point in the text, the MLPD has not yet provided any proof that this ideology is fascist. In addition, another passage from the Charter should be mentioned here, which calls on women to fight for national liberation. For in the event that an enemy occupies the homeland, it states: »a woman must go out and fight the enemy even without her husband’s authorization.«⁸⁵ This sentence should not be overrated and of course it does not negate Hamas’ patriarchal family image, but it clearly contradicts the claim that they advocate for the total subservience of women to men.

The MLPD further bemoans that »Social aid programs, which Hamas uses to gain influence, are racist and geared towards the »national community«: »Muslim society is one of solidarity with one another.« How terrible that Muslims are in solidarity with each other… But seriously: I’ve only ever heard the Muslim community equated with a fascist ethnic community from »anti‐German« Zionists. As far as Hamas’ relationship with non‐Muslim Palestinians is concerned, Khaled Hroub emphasizes: »In its conduct towards the Palestinian Christians Hamas has shown extraordinary sensitivity« and »has succeeded in establishing cordial relationships with« them.⁸⁶

As far as I know, Hamas makes no distinction between Muslims and Christians in its charitable work. Incidentally, non‐Muslims can also become members of Hamas⁸⁷ and in the 2006 elections Hamas supported two independent Christian candidates.⁸⁸ »In practice, however, the supposedly cross‐class solidarity Muslim society is reduced to social charity«, concludes the MLPD. This is not entirely correct, but it is not entirely wrong either — and above all it has nothing to do with fascism or racism. Alms are the answer of all bourgeois actors (with the exception of the most blatant social Darwinists and ultra‐liberals) to the impoverishment resulting from capitalism.

And finally: »Hamas promotes fascist conspiracy myths and is extremely anti‐revolutionary and anti‐communist«. On the issue of conspiracy myths, see Myth 3 above, as well as Myth 4 on Hamas’ real relationship to the political left. Otherwise, it should be emphasized once again that Hamas has long since distanced itself from the Charter and its problematic passages. (Myth 12) Finally, the MLPD also makes the accusation of anti‐Semitism. (Myth 3 again) That’s it. That’s all there is to it.

Kommunistischer Aufbau (Communist Construction)

The Kommunistischer Aufbau (KA) has raised the accusation of fascism against Hamas far less hysterically than the MLPD. In fact, it can only be found in its publications upon second glance. In a text from 2018, it describes »Islamic fundamentalism« as a whole as fascist. Hamas is only mentioned in passing as one of several groups of »exiled fundamentalists.«⁸⁹ The text cited here is the second part of a two‐part series of articles by KA on »Islamic fundamentalism«. The first part presents the »core thesis« of the texts, according to which »Islamic fundamentalism« is »a fascist ideology.«⁹⁰ All Islamic actors are subsumed under this term, from the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas to the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Taliban to Al‐Qaeda and Daesh.⁹¹ The second article in particular reads in large parts like a (red‐painted) report from the BfV (German domestic intelligence agency). The first part, on the one hand, is primarily a series of very different examples in which various actors from different countries, who are somehow lumped together as »Islamic fundamentalists«, have done things that we as communists find politically bad (capitalist policies, pacts with imperialists, persecution of communists, etc.). These include the classics: the Iranian revolution of 1979 (see also Myths 13 and 14); the West’s support for the Afghan mujahedeen; the Arab oil monarchies: the collaboration of Amin al‐Hussayni — the so‐called Grand Mufti of Jerusalem — with the Nazis; and the Muslim Brotherhood’s alleged closeness to European fascism.⁹² (For the latter, see Myth 5)

There is just as little real argumentation as there is an in‐depth analysis of even a single one of the events mentioned. Against the background of this very questionable historical overview, the thesis is ultimately justified by the fact that »Islamic fundamentalism« is primarily a »fascist ideology«. In contrast to the MLPD, the KA does not even attempt to prove this assertion with concrete arguments such as alleged racism or the like. Instead, it presents a mosaic of incoherent theoretical set pieces, ideological highlights and historical snippets, which results in a very blurred overall picture of reactionary moments, which issomehow sold as an alleged analysis under the label »Islamic fundamentalism«.

However, the KA may have changed its position on this issue in recent years. As recently as 2021, it accused Hamas and Islamic Jihad of »Islamic fundamentalist, anti‐Semitic and fascist positions,« »such as calling for the annihilation of the Israeli people or the expulsion of Jews from West Asia.«⁹³

Both are absolute nonsense and correspond to the wildest (pro-)Zionist propaganda lies.⁹⁴ On 9 October, however, they described Hamas and the Qassam Brigades as one of several »Palestinian resistance organizations«. Even though it talks about »reactionary characteristics of bourgeois Palestinian nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism«, the KA expresses itself completely differently from the MLPD about October 7: »Both in terms of the means the resistance fighters used and in terms of the tactical military successes achieved, this operation is unparalleled in recent decades.«⁹⁵

This is a small sign of hope that they are backing away from their nonsensical position and thus leaving the MLPD completely alone within the political left in Germany (and presumably worldwide) when it comes to defaming Hamas as »fascist«.

Myth 5: »The Muslim Brotherhood had contacts with Nazi Germany.«

If Hamas cannot be described as fascist today, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has at least been guilty of collaborating with European fascists, right? (See also Myth 4)

The Muslim Brotherhood and fascism

This is not correct either. In the 1930s—i.e. before the Second World War — the MB received funds from German agencies on several occasions, but this was not unusual. During the war, »some members of the Brotherhood« also distributed pro‐German leaflets. Hassan al‐Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, came under pressure as a result and publicly declared his loyalty to the Egyptian and pro‐British government.⁹⁶

As there is no evidence of any significant cooperation, a »congeniality« between the MB and the fascist movements in Europe is often constructed. The argument is usually based on superficialities such as the organizational structure and appearance or the »radicalism« or »totalitarianism«. In reality, however, al‐Banna was already trying to differentiate himself from fascism in 1934. He regarded these movements as thoroughly »alien phenomena that were incompatible with the religious and cultural foundations of Islam«, as Israel Gershoni and Götz Nordbruch write. »The denunciation of these models of rule as pagan and satanic provided the propagated Islamic alternative with additional legitimacy. Added to this was the characterization of social forms in Europe and the USA as the basis of the imperialist threat to the Islamic community. In the view of the Muslim Brotherhood, the urge for territorial, economic and cultural expansion was part of the essence of Western societies […] Italian fascism and National Socialism were no exception to this view.«⁹⁷ Italian colonialism in Africa and the fascists’ racial ideologies in particular were met with complete rejection;⁹⁸ Gudrun Krämer lists numerous statements by al‐Banna from 1934 – 48 in which he opposes racism.⁹⁹

In fact, there were many more nationalist members of the military who later maintained contact with German agents during the German‐Italian North African campaign, including in or around the so‐called Free Officers around Gamal Abdel Nasser, who were classified as left‐wing nationalist to Arab‐socialist. The key figure here was Anwar al‐Sadat, Abdel Nasser’s successor, who led the country away from »Arab socialism«, brought it closer to the West and made peace with Israel at Camp David in 1978, making Egypt the first Arab country to recognize the Zionist entity as a state. However, even he cannot be shown to have any sympathy for Nazi ideology and, like most other nationalist and patriotic Egyptians, did not rely on a German victory to drive out the British colonial rulers, but rather hoped to keep his country out of the world war.¹⁰⁰

Amin al‐Hussayni as a key witness

The figure most consistently cited inorder to collectively accuse the Palestinians or even all Arabs or Muslims of being close to fascism is Hajj Amin al‐Hussayni, one of the leaders of the Palestinian independence movement during British colonial rule. In fact, he was probably the only Palestinian who can be proven to have cooperated with Nazi Germany at all.¹⁰¹ He was guilty of this collaboration between 1941 and 1945 and presumably also knew about the Holocaust. However, the resulting accusation by Netanyahu and others that it was he who gave Hitler the idea of genocide in the first place is ridiculous.¹⁰² Rather, al‐Hussayni allowed himself to be exploited by the fascist military for propaganda and recruitment, especially in the Balkans and the Soviet Union, while the Nazis did not even promise him official support for his actual goal, the liberation of the Arab countries from colonialism.¹⁰³ As Ilan Pappe emphasizes, al-Hussayni’s work must be seen and judged in the context of the Palestinians’ anti‐colonial struggle:

In the circumstances he was forced into the arms of his enemy’s enemy, in this case Italy and Germany. While in political asylum in Germany for two years, he came under the influence of Nazi doctrine and confused the distinction between Judaism and Zionism. His willingness to serve as a radio commentator for the Nazis and to help recruit Muslims in the Balkans to the German war effort no doubt stains his career. But he did not act any differently from the Zionist leaders in the 1930s, who themselves sought an alliance with the Nazis against the British Empire, or from all the other anti‐colonialist movements who wanted to get rid of the Empire by way of alliances with its principal enemies.¹⁰⁴

Pappe’s latter remark alludes to the fact that the Zionists cooperated with the Nazis by, among other things: concluding the infamous Ha’avara agreement with the German fascists in 1933, which was intended to persuade German Jews to flee to Palestine (and did so); blocking the fight against Nazi Germany internationally; and collaborating with German secret services against the British.¹⁰⁵ At the same time, it should also be emphasized here that al‐Hussayni, before he fell out of favor in London and turned to the Axis powers, collaborated with the British colonial power, was appointed Mufti of Jerusalem by it in the first place (although his religious training was not sufficient for this) and served it insofar as he helped to divide the Palestinian national movement and turn it exclusively against the Jewish population, but not against the British.¹⁰⁶ A wide‐ranging discussion of al‐Hussayni can be found in Rainer Zimmer‐Winkel¹⁰⁷, while the Lebanese Trotskyist Gilbert Achcar wrote a factual but sharp reckoning with him.¹⁰⁸

Al‐Hussayni had probably been in close contact with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Palestine since the 1920s, but never belonged to them.¹⁰⁹ Rather, he was a central figure in the Palestinian national movement, came from an influential family and held a formal religious leadership role, which made him a positive reference person. The work of Zionist historian Joseph Croitoru illustrates how attempts are made to construct a connection between Nazi Germany and the Muslim Brotherhood and even Hamas by including al‐Hussayni: He writes of »indications« that the Nazis »had a hand in the establishment of paramilitary branches of the MB«; he reports — but without naming the exact time — of German funds going to the Brotherhood, and claims that al‐Hussayni, who allegedly »was already working closely with the Nazis at the time«, was »obviously« acting as a middleman. Because the whole thing is all too tenuous, Croitoru goes on to write: »Whatever this collaboration may have been« — in other words, it doesn’t really matter what it really was — »the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nazis had […] a common goal«, namely the »liberation of Palestine from British rule.«¹¹⁰ The fact that the Nazis wanted to replace the British as the colonial power, while the Palestinians fought for their national independence, is not a difference worth mentioning for the Zionist Croitoru. Croitoru leaves no doubt that Hamas’ fight for the liberation of Palestine from Zionist rule is, of course, the continuation of this joint »holy war« (the imaginative title of the sub‐chapter in his book) fought together by the Nazis and the Muslim Brotherhood. The fact that leftists in solidarity with Palestine, such as Kommunistische Aufbau, argue similarly (see Myth 4) is alarming.

In reality, al‐Hussayni plays no important role today for either the MB or Hamas; the latter makes much more positive reference to guerrilla leaders and popular heroes from the 1930s, such as Izz ad‐Din al‐Qassam, after whom the military arm of Hamas is named, or Abdul Qader al‐Hussayni.¹¹¹ Achcar¹¹², Flores¹¹³, Krämer¹¹⁴, Motadel¹¹⁵, Pappe¹¹⁶, Wildangel¹¹⁷ and many others agree that the role and influence of the Mufti is widely overestimated in Western discourse; René Wildangel even speaks of a »veritable »muftization« of Arab‐Palestinian history of the Mandate period in historiography.«¹¹⁸ This politically motivated overemphasis of his role by Western, pro‐Zionist actors is something the Mufti has in common with the infamous Hamas Charter (Myth 12).

Myth 6: »Hamas is a terrorist organization.«

a) »Terror organization«?

First and foremost, one must question the use of the very term here– because while »terror« can be defined to some extent, it is much more difficult to define what exactly a »terrorist organization« is. Terror can be defined very generally as the »[systematic] spreading of fear and horror through violent actions (especially to achieve political goals).«¹¹⁹

It is immediately apparent that in reality this type of political violence is not only used by non‐state actors — i.e., the first thing we think of when we think of »terrorist organizations« — but also by state actors, and indeed on a much larger scale. Just think of the colonial wars of conquest and oppression, of fascism, of the Second World War, of the anti‐colonial wars of liberation, of Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. and, not least, of the actions of the Zionists in Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. That is to say that there is extensive state terror. Despite this, the term »terrorist state« is rather rare and obviously has a moral, propagandistic or polemical usage.

On the other hand, most of the really relevant armed fighting organizations in history had a political program, and the violence was merely the continuation of this policy by other means. Incidentally, »terrorist« was a positive self‐designation of political groups in the 19th century and even into the 20th century, especially in contrast to the violence of criminal organizations.¹²⁰

Today, however, the term has clearly negative connotations. To reduce these groups to their use of violence, i.e. to describe them as »terrorist organizations«, is not only pejorative, but also superficial and would ultimately say little about their political character. One can criticize or reject (disproportionate) violence as a political instrument, but a political goal or ideology itself remains good or bad, regardless of the means used to achieve it: A pacifist racist may be less dangerous, but his ideology is still wrong and must be opposed; and a movement that fights against national or social oppression does not automatically lose its legitimacy just because it uses violence to do so.

However, we repeatedly encounter the term »terrorist organization« in political and media discourse and therefore also in everyday speech. This is clearly a matter of political power: politicians and the media dictate who is to be considered a »terrorist« and who is not. One of the most famous examples is Nelson Mandela, who was on the US terror list until 2008, around a decade and a half after the end of apartheid, his election as President of South Africa and his appointment as Nobel Peace Prize winner. Discursively, it is also fascinating to trace the West’s media support for the »Mujahedeen« in Afghanistan: at one time, the killing of »infidels« was celebrated in Der Spiegel and the jihad fighters were honored as »freedom fighters«.¹²¹ The magazine was in tune with the prevailing discourse and politics in the FRG and the West.

This state power, which is already evident in sovereignty over discourse, fully unfolds when the classification as a »terrorist organization« also reaches the legal sphere, for example in the form of the EU terror lists and paragraphs 129 (a) and (b) of the German Criminal Code. Then political opponents can be repressed at will. The arbitrariness at work here is best illustrated by the PKK ban in Germany: PKK flags are banned in Germany due to the PKK’s classification as a »foreign terrorist organization,« and the 1993 ban on their activities. To display, on the the other hand, the flag of the YPG — i.e., the PKK’s sister organization just over the border in Syria — is very logically not prohibited, as the YPG collaborates with NATO—unless it is carried as a »substitute« for the PKK flag, and then of course it is banned. How one determines whether this is the case or not is a matter of »discretion,« the legalese term for simple arbitrariness. Just like the term »terrorism,« these elastic legal categories can be easily bent to suit one’s needs.

Personally, I am therefore fundamentally skeptical about the use of the term »terrorist organization« in an analytical sense. Of course, one can describe the National Socialist Underground (German: Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund) or the SS and SA as fascist terrorist organizations — and one would certainly not be wrong in doing so, since their primary task as the armed wing of the fascists was to spread terror. Describing the IOF as a terror militia in order to agitate and to take up and deliberately subvert existing narratives can also make propaganda sense. In both instances, however, the political content analysis is the starting point. In any case, one should be aware that the term »terrorist« is always politically determined and that it is usually those in power who determine who is a »terrorist« and who is not.

b) Violence against civilians

Even if we agreed to reject the term »terrorist organization«, however, it could still be possible that Hamas commits terroristic violence. A distinction must be made between two things: First of all, attacks that are to be classified as terrorist (at least legally speaking) are generally equivalent to war crimes under international law. Concrete war crimes belong before the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court (if one recognizes it) or, according to the International Criminal Code, also before German courts. But charges against any persons classified as »terror supporters« or even »sympathizers« before German courts are absurd. Either you commit a war crime yourself, or act as an accessory to one — or you don’t.

In the case of Palestine, the most common accusation against Hamas is that it carries out attacks on civilians. However, this is a complicated question in the settler‐colonial context, because settlers are objectively part of the occupation, quite apart from the fact that an extremely large number of them are armed and almost all Israelis do military service. Settling people in occupied territory is a war crime.¹²²

This crime poses a dilemma for a national liberation movement, because if one uses force against such an illegally settled population, one is also committing a crime from a purely formal legal point of view, and one crime does not justify another crime; on the other hand, if one permits it, liberation becomes virtually impossible. This is where the law reaches its limits. Morally and politically, of course, it becomes particularly perfidious when this settler population also hides behind their »civilian‐ness«, while at the same time they very consciously and for ideological reasons stand behind the (illegal) seizure of land.

In view of this, it is widespread in the current discourse of the Palestinian resistance that all (adult) settlers are basically considered legitimate targets. Until 1994, Hamas itself made a strict distinction between Zionist soldiers on the one hand and »civilian« settlers on the other. The massacre in Hebron in 1994, in which the mass murderer Baruch Goldstein shot 29 Palestinians while they were praying in a mosque, changed this. From this period onwards, Hamas also targeted non‐combatants for the first time. At that point, it was mainly so‐called suicide attacks that had a major psychological impact and were carried out in exceptional situations, for example in response to the assassination of Hamas leaders or during the Second Intifada.¹²³

Later, it was mainly knife attacks, and today it is mostly attacks with cars or firearms on settlers, which may be considered »attacks on civilians« under international law, but which enjoy great support among the Palestinian population and also among all resistance organizations. As a solidarity movement, we must come to terms with this fact. The fact that the new legal situation and the current repression in the Federal Republic of Germany severely restrict a debate about this, because one is quickly accused of »condoning criminal acts« according to Paragraph 140 of the German Criminal Code, presents us with even greater hurdles in this debate than the public pressure of the current morally inflated and completely hysterical discourse about October 7 and Hamas. It should be noted here that Hamas itself distinguishes between combatants (armed Israelis) and civilians (unarmed Israelis) in its account of the »Al‐Aqsa flood.«¹²⁴

Mahmood Mamdani, however, points out that the »civilian dilemma« applies to both sides in the context of settler colonialism and the national liberation movement: Like the left‐wing guerrilla, the right‐wing settler, too, blurs the boundary between the civil and the military.«¹²⁵ Recently, in the context of Palestine solidarity, one has repeatedly heard the admonition that talking about »women and children« »normalizes« the killing of Palestinian men. Part of this problem is also that we have to bear in mind that the Palestinian guerrillas are generally not classic soldiers who are in the pay of a standing army and have more or less voluntarily decided to go to war. They are (often enough very young) men who feel compelled to defend their homeland and risk their lives to do so. We should therefore consider carefully whether we make a distinction between Palestinian resistance fighters and civilians. One might object that this would be playing into the hands of the Zionists, who declare the entire population of Gaza »guilty« and equate them with Hamas. However, our response must be a fundamentally oppositional one: Neither the Palestinians as a whole, nor Hamas or the rest of the resistance are »guilty«, only the Zionists are! One should even say that resistance fighters are not killed, but murdered, because the Zionist regime and its violence have no legitimacy whatsoever!

c) »Suicide bombings«

Countless texts have been written and films made about this phenomenon in the West. Not because it is particularly politically or legally relevant, but above all because it obviously fascinates and horrifies many people: a person kills others and accepts his own death in the process. But ultimately this happens in every second war movie: a »hero« throws himself against a superior enemy force and to his certain death. It only becomes scary and strange or »fascinating« when the person making the sacrifice is a Muslim and uses explosives instead of a firearm or a sword.

Mamdani writes:

»I have often wondered whether the label »suicide bombing« accurately captures either the practice or the motivation behind it. Clearly, the prime objective of the suicide bomber is not to terminate his or her own life but that of others defined as enemies. We need to recognize the suicide bomber, first and foremost, as a category of soldier. Suicide bombing needs to be understood as a feature of modern political violence rather than stigmatized as a mark of barbarism.«¹²⁶

And indeed, he also points out that martyrdom is celebrated in the West:

»As a secondary‐school student in colonial Uganda, I remember having to memorize Tennyson’s poem ›The Charge of the Light Brigade‹. This is what I remember of Tennyson’s tribute to the heroism of British soldiers who knowingly went ›into the jaws of death‹: ›Cannon to right of them, /Cannon to left of them, /Cannon behind them /Volley’d and thunder’d; … Into the jaws of Death, /Into the mouth of Hell /Rode the six hundred‹.«¹²⁷

Leaving aside the exoticizing psychobabble, the matter is quickly clarified: martyrdom operations are not war crimes per se. Neither taking one’s own life nor using explosives are crimes in themselves. The only thing that matters (in terms of international law) is the aim of the operation: is it military and therefore legitimate or civilian and therefore illegitimate? Of course, these operations are also a social and psychological expression of something. In terms of society as a whole, however, if they occur more frequently, they are probably less a sign of »religious fanaticism« than of military inferiority and a desperate social situation.

Finally, a few facts about Hamas and the so‐called suicide attacks: as mentioned under b), they began after the Goldstein massacre and then took place in exceptional situations. In addition to Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and the Al‐Aqsa Martyrs Brigades also carried out martyrdom operations with explosives. In April 2008, Hamas claimed responsibility for a martyrdom operation for the last time, in which the fighters blew themselves up. They only injured Israeli soldiers,¹²⁸ which is why this operation was undoubtedly legitimate under international law.

d) »Hostage‐taking«

While Hamas fighters had generally killed captured soldiers in previous years, they have been used since 1992 at the latest by Hamas to free their own prisoners instead.¹²⁹ Experience shows that those detained by the Qassam Brigades are treated well — quite unlike the Palestinian hostages in the Zionist prisons — even if they are held for years, such as Gilad Shalit, or under the most adverse circumstances, such as those taken on October 7th.

The arbitrary detention of non‐combatants in particular may be legally and morally problematic. However, four points should be considered here:

The dilemma described under point b) above.
The fact that the taking of hostages is a relatively common practice, especially in wars between unequal opponents or in guerrilla warfare.
The fact that in these hostage‐takings the »higher value« of the settlers over the indigenous people can be turned against the colonial rulers: A single captured settler can be exchanged for many times more Palestinian hostages. Incidentally, this practice is not only pursued by Hamas, but has also been practiced in the past —particularly by the PFLP, but also by Fatah, the DFLP, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the PFLP‐GC, etc. And
It must be emphasized that the Zionist policy of arrests is nothing other than state hostage‐taking, carried out on a far greater scale than Hamas ever could. Tens of thousands of Palestinian children and young people have been and continue to be affected by this practice to this day.

e) Classification of Hamas as a »terrorist organization«

Finally, a few facts about the classification of Hamas as a »terrorist organization«: Hamas is only listed as a »terrorist organization« by the Western states, i.e. Israel, the EU states, the USA, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and Japan, as well as Paraguay.¹³⁰ We are therefore talking about a vanishing minority of 33 compared to the other 160 UN member states. And even some European countries, such as Norway and Switzerland, as well as the NATO member Turkey, do not criminalize Hamas. Incidentally, the inclusion of Hamas in the EU terror list in 2003 was initially only the result of massive Israeli lobbying.¹³¹

The fact that several Hamas leaders have also been placed on the list as individuals since October 7^th underlines the fact that it is primarily a tool of political arbitrariness and symbolism.

f) Conclusion

Hamas is not a »terrorist organization«, but, firstly, an elementary component of the Palestinian liberation movement (Myths 8 and 9) and, secondly, the only government of the Palestinians in the territories occupied in 1967 that has so far been legitimized by elections. (Myth 10) That it is branded as such as »terrorist« by the imperialist Western powers and the Zionist colonial regime is both logical and completely unacceptable. We must expose this defamation for what it is: an expression of colonial arrogance and, above all, a delegitimization and dehumanization of Palestinian resistance aimed at elimination. For we must realize that it is not just a matter of a word: »terrorists«, according to the prevailing discourse and common practice, may be killed without ifs and buts. The designation as a »terrorist« therefore directly legitimizes the murder of Palestinian freedom fighters and (government) politicians. Thus, the inclusion of Hamas on the EU terror list gave the green light for the assassination of Shaykh Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi (as well as numerous relatives and people who happened to be present) by Israel soon afterwards.¹³² We are currently experiencing how the Zionists are even legitimizing genocide by equating the people of Gaza with their government. The answer, however, cannot be an artificial separation between the Palestinians and their most popular liberation organization and elected government, but the consistent rejection of the denigration of Hamas as a »terrorist organization«.

Myth 7: »Hamas is reactionary.«

So if Hamas is neither fundamentalist (Myth 2) nor fascist (Myth 4) nor anti‐Semitic (Myth 3) nor terrorist (Myth 6), it is at least reactionary, isn’t it? After all, as described in Myth 2, it is religiously conservative. The answer is: yes and no, but mainly no. Yes, insofar as conservatism is fundamentally »reactionary«. A »potential« yes, insofar as Hamas, as a bourgeois, conservative force, can of course always fall into a reactionary role in the future — for example as a traitor to the Palestinian national cause — or if it actively opposes a socialist revolution. The latter could happen even before the national liberation of Palestine, namely if forces such as the PFLP or the Palestinian Communist Party were to take over the leadership of the Palestinian liberation movement — but this scenario is currently very unlikely. Or — and this is much more likely — after national liberation, when the struggle for socialism must be placed more clearly on the agenda. Yet the answer is a resounding no with regards to the national question, which is obviously the main contradiction in Palestine today: here Hamas clearly presents itself as a relatively reliable and consistent force in comparison to other bourgeois forces in this struggle. (See Myths 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14)

Ultimately, this myth can be refuted less with facts than with arguments. The facts can be found above in Myths 1 to 6 and in Myths 9, 10, 11 and 14. In the end, the main question is this: What does the category »reactionary« refer to? Does it refer exclusively to ideology or to the entire, above all social nature of an actor? Is it understood in relation to social conditions, i.e. dialectically and materialistically? Or is it essentialist, i.e. does it assume immutability and is therefore idealistic and dogmatic? In my opinion, Hamas can only be evaluated in relation to the real historical social situation in Palestine. With regard to social and cultural issues, it used to hold strong, and nowadays holds rather moderate, conservative positions, and is exposed to social moods to which it is very susceptible.¹³³

Moreover, it is certainly not a revolutionary socialist organization, but rather advocates a bourgeois‐capitalist society, even if the fight against poverty in the sense of charitable measures and a strong social policy play a central role for it, as do economic independence from the Zionist regime and a better trade position vis‐à‐vis the imperialist and neighboring states.¹³⁴ With regard to the central struggle in Palestine, the national revolution, on the other hand, it is largely consistent, very self‐sacrificing, relatively intelligent, and strongly anchored in the masses — in other words: it is revolutionary. So it is both bourgeois‐conservative and revolutionary. In the end, analysis always goes further than labels. What is clear, nonetheless, is that the label »reactionary« in relation to Hamas is a misnomer in any case.

Finally, a comment on the elephant in the room when it comes to this topic: in this debate, the suspicion always arises that in the end it is less about the bourgeois character of Hamas and much more about its religious coloration. This is because the movement also shares its bourgeois character with other liberation organizations, such as Fatah in the 1960s to 1980s, the ANC before the end of apartheid, etc. Since latent hostility towards religion and especially Islam is unfortunately a major problem among leftists, it should be pointed out here that a Marxist critique of religion is something completely different from chauvinism towards religious people. My impression is that the latter is unfortunately much more widespread among leftists than the former. (See also Myth 14)

Myth 8: »Hamas is not a liberation movement.«

Following on from Myth 7, one can argue further here. Hamas is fighting for the national liberation of Palestine; it is fighting against settler colonialism and the Western imperialism behind it. Its goal is a country liberated from foreign occupation, apartheid, racism and national oppression, where the population is equal regardless of religious affiliation and where displaced indigenous people enjoy the right of return. Why should an organization, party and movement that pursues such a goal, that is anchored in the masses and enjoys support far beyond its direct base (including among the Christian, secular, and leftist segments of the population) not be a liberation movement?

If one has seen through Myths 1 to 7, does not subscribe to romanticized notions of guerrillas and partisans, and does not confuse national liberation with socialist revolution, there is no argument left as to why Hamas should not be categorized as a liberation movement.

Myth 9: »Hamas divides the resistance.«

Myths 1 and 14 explain the actual ways in which the Zionists have used the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) to weaken the Palestinian liberation movement. The latter also mentions that Fatah sometimes supported the MB against left‐wing forces. And Myth 1 also deals with the competitive relationship between the MB and Hamas on the one hand and Islamic Jihad on the other. Both sections also describe how Hamas also made a break with its past with regard to this sectarianism towards the national resistance forces, albeit not immediately.

Hamas and the PLO

During the First Intifada, Hamas initially acted in competition with the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) consisting of Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP, the Communist Party and Islamic Jihad.¹³⁵ It was not until the end of 1992 that a joint declaration with the UNLU and the PLO was issued for the first time, in response to the deportation of 415 (alleged) Hamas members by Israel.¹³⁶

Nevertheless, Hamas’ relationship with the PLO remained ambivalent: in its charter, it referred to the Palestine Liberation Organization as »a father, a brother, a relative, a friend« and as »closest to the heart.«¹³⁷ However, the purpose of the PLO as a popular front was precisely not to be »close« to other Palestinian liberation forces, but to unite them all under its umbrella. In 1990, Hamas »asked« for admission to the PLO or the Palestinian National Council for the first time, modestly demanding 40 to 50 percent of the seats in the PNC, which the PLO naturally rejected.¹³⁸ In the following years, there were repeated talks about admission, but ultimately it never transpired. In 2005, it looked as if it might finally succeed as part of a restructuring of the PLO. However, Hamas’ election victory in 2006 marked the beginning of the end of these efforts: its landslide victory »dealt the greatest blow to Fatah and the PLO, this time challenging the status of ‘the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’ as it had never been challenged before. In its cabinet platform, Hamas refused, once again, to recognize the sole legitimacy and representation of the PLO, infuriating Fatah and many other Palestinians who have argued that the PLO is above factional rivalry,« as Khaled Hroub puts it.¹³⁹ The Fatah leadership’s policy of sabotage, subversion and treason in the following months, which resulted in an open power struggle between Hamas and Fatah, and the split between Gaza and Ramallah (Myth 10), finally buried a possible PLO accession by Hamas for the time being.

Hamas and the resistance

Beyond the PLO, however, Hamas certainly proved that it was prepared to cooperate with other resistance forces: in the 1990s, it organized itself together with the PFLP, DFLP, PFLP‐GC, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and others to form a rejectionist front against the Oslo betrayal.¹⁴⁰ After its election victory in 2006, Hamas endeavored to form a government of national unity, despite the fact that it alone had an absolute majority in parliament.¹⁴¹ Although Hamas has ruled alone in the Gaza Strip since 2007, it does cooperate with the other resistance forces: In recent years up to 7 October, for example, it performed a tightrope act in an attempt to keep Gaza out of further fighting with Israel while at the same time giving organizations such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad in particular as free a hand as possible; in addition, it is highly likely that funds flowed from Gaza to the resistance in the West Bank.¹⁴² Similarly, it has been channeling funds from abroad to other liberation organizations in Gaza for some time.¹⁴³ Finally, together with the other organizations, it established the Joint Operations Room of the Palestinian resistance groups in 2018, which has expanded its cooperation in recent years, and it has been fighting side by side with Islamic Jihad, PFLP, DFLP and other armed groups in the »Al‐Aqsa flood« operation since the 7^th of October 2023.

Hamas and Fatah

At the same time, Hamas has repeatedly declared its willingness to sit down at the table with Fatah again: It deliberately declared the power struggle in the Gaza Strip in 2007 (Myth 10) not as a fight against Fatah, but against the militia of local Fatah leader Muhammad Dahlan.¹⁴⁴ In 2013, Hamas took a symbolic step towards Fatah by allowing it to publicly celebrate its founding day in Gaza again for the first time.¹⁴⁵ The following year, there was even a unity government negotiated between Hamas and Fatah. In the associated agreement, Hamas declared its willingness to hand over political power in the Gaza Strip to Fatah on the condition that it would not be disarmed and thus not be crushed as a resistance organization. This was intended to reunite Gaza and the West Bank politically. The agreement ultimately failed due to the reluctance of Fatah’s leadership around Mahmoud Abbas to accept Hamas as a legitimate resistance force in return for a handover of power in Gaza.¹⁴⁶ In 2017, a reconciliation agreement was reached between Fatah and Hamas alongside Hamas’ new policy paper (Myth 12), which Hamas claimed it would abide by until the elections scheduled for 2021.¹⁴⁷ However, these elections were then again canceled by Abbas, who (rightly) expected to be voted out of office.¹⁴⁸ He was elected president in 2003 and his mandate expired in 2009; since then, he has led the PA without legitimacy and in an extremely authoritarian manner.

Tel Aviv and Washington have always been involved in all of this by putting pressure on Hamas and Fatah every time there has been a rapprochement between the two. Helga Baumgarten summarizes this strategy as follows: »Israel and the USA systematically prevent any rapprochement between Ramallah and Gaza in order to maintain the Palestinian division and the conflict between Fatah and Hamas. This policy of »divide and rule« promises control over the Palestinians with the more or less complete subjugation of Ramallah […] Gaza, on the other hand, is regularly bombed to the ground every few years.«¹⁴⁹

Myth 10: »Hamas seized power by coup d’état.«

In 2006, Hamas won the elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, the parliament in the territories occupied in 1967: 74 out of 132 seats, i.e. an absolute majority, went to Hamas; Fatah only managed 45 seats.¹⁵⁰ Neither Hamas, nor the previously ruling Fatah, nor Israel, nor the West had expected this victory. Hamas leader Ismail Haniya »immediately declared his intention to form a government of national unity.« However, mainly due to pressure from the USA and Mahmoud Abbas, not even a coalition government was formed in the end. »Against its declared intentions, Hamas had to form a pure Hamas government, along with a few independent technocrats.«¹⁵¹ In Muriel Asseburg’s assessment:

»overall, Hamas did not succeed in establishing an effective government in its first year in office, nor in gaining control over the security situation, let alone implementing its ambitious reform program. This may have been partly due to the fact that the movement was not sufficiently prepared to govern. First and foremost, however, it had to contend with a number of obstacles […] One of these was Fatah’s obstructive stance, which was in no way willing to accept its election defeat and relinquish power or cooperate with the government. This meant that the government formed in March 2006 had no access to the institutions of the executive, which it would have needed to actually govern — the office of president, the entire PA security apparatus, and the ministries were and still are predominantly occupied by Fatah members, most of whom refused to cooperate with Hamas on the instructions of President Abbas. Furthermore, the Hamas‐led government failed due to the isolation (or increasingly embargo) policy of Israel and the West, which deprived the government of its financial basis […]. In the internal Palestinian power struggle, the West sided entirely with President and Fatah leader Abbas, whom it not only supported diplomatically, but also […] provided with funding. At the same time, the West also tolerated President Abbas rolling back earlier reform measures after Hamas’s election victory in order to consolidate his power.«¹⁵²

In response, Hamas attempted to build up its own loyal security forces, but as Asseburg further notes:

»With the support of neighboring states and American financial aid, Fatah also increased its arsenal of weapons and began to strengthen its security forces through additional training measures. Increasingly violent clashes between the armed groups, security forces and militias on both sides were the result. Around 200 Palestinians died in the year following Hamas’ takeover of government.«¹⁵³

Abbas once again proved to be a man of the West. As Helga Baumgarten observed:

»For the uninvolved observer, a power struggle played out, as it had between President Arafat and his Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas in 2003, only with the colors reversed. While Abbas, with massive support from the West, had tried to take as much control as possible over the PA’s security organs away from the then President Arafat, Abbas was now attempting once again, with full support from the West, to take as much influence as possible from the Haniyeh government and especially the Minister of the Interior over the security organs.«¹⁵⁴

In March 2007, a government of national unity was formed through the mediation of Saudi Arabia, comprising Hamas, Fatah, the DFLP, the Palestinian People’s Party (formerly the Communist Party) and other smaller parties. However, this government soon collapsed due to the continued obstructionism of Fatah, which wanted to retain power over the security forces, as well as the policy of the West, which continued to focus on isolating Hamas.¹⁵⁵

As Asseburg details,»In spring 2007, the USA began to supply Fatah directly with money, training and military equipment.« Support also came from Europe:

»Hamas found itself under increasing pressure due to the establishment of additional Fatah militias. When Israel gave the green light for the delivery of heavy weapons to Fatah units in the Gaza Strip and at the same time the Fatah leadership and other representatives of the unity government were out of the country, it took the opportunity to rid itself of the danger.«¹⁵⁶

Tareq Baconi speaks of a »blank cheque« that the USA gave Fatah militia leader Dahlan in 2007 for his actions against Hamas.¹⁵⁷ Baumgarten appears to assume that Hamas reacted almost at the last possible second: »This coup [i.e. of Fatah taking over Gaza] did not happen because Hamas obviously beat the Fatah security forces under Mohammad Dahlan to it.«¹⁵⁸

On June 10, 2007, the Qassam Brigades attacked Dahlan’s troops. The fighting lasted until June 14. In the end, the Fatah militias in the Gaza Strip were crushed and 161 people were dead. Crimes were apparently committed on both sides, such as extrajudicial executions. The pre‐emptive strike damaged Hamas’ reputation among many Palestinians. It also lost power in the West Bank for good. Since then, it has ruled Gaza alone, while Abbas has established an authoritarian regime in Ramallah.¹⁵⁹

Let us summarize: What is known as the Hamas coup was an attempt by a party elected by an absolute majority, which had done everything possible to create a government in the interests of the people and together with all other political actors, to maintain its position in the face of a real coup instigated by Western imperialism and the Zionist occupation regime. In view of the fact that the Gaza Strip is still the capital of the Palestinian liberation movement today, while Abbas’ puppet regime is doing everything it can to choke off the resistance in the West Bank, the assessment can only be positive in retrospect: It is only because Hamas struck in time back then that the resistance in Palestine today has the strength it demonstrated so impressively on October 7!

Myth 11: »You can’t negotiate with Hamas.«

This accusation is mainly made by opponents of the Palestinian cause. Nevertheless, it should be addressed here, as it is unfortunately also a widespread myth among Palestinian solidarity activists. The accusation is also often combined with Hamas’ alleged lack of willingness to compromise. This is also a myth.

First of all, it should be pointed out that uncompromisingness is not a bad thing in itself. It always depends on what the specific issue is; it depends on the topic and the counterpart. The fact that Hamas is quite willing to compromise, pragmatic and adaptable in its policy towards the Palestinians, and has also developed significantly on these and many other issues, can be read in various parts of this text. (Myths 1, 2, 9, 10, 12 and 14)

De facto two‐state solution

In addition, it has not only changed in terms of its fundamental attitude towards Zionism and Judaism (Myths 3 and 12), but has also repeatedly shown itself willing to compromise and negotiate with the Israeli state — for while it advocates the liberation of the whole of Palestine, it has repeatedly announced that it is prepared to lay down its arms in return for a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders (at least in the medium to long term). The first such proposal dates back to 1988 and was made by two Hamas leaders, Mahmoud al‐Zahhar and Shaykh Ahmad Yassin, both in direct talks with high‐ranking Zionist politicians and to the Israeli press. The second offer was made in 1991, but both attempts failed because the Zionist regime refused to respond to Hamas’ demand that the IOF should first withdraw from the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem and that the territory should be transferred to UN control.¹⁶⁰ At the beginning of 1993, on the very eve of the so‐called »Oslo peace process«, the organization declared that it was prepared to support a peaceful path on condition that, firstly, the IOF withdrew from the territories occupied in 1967 and, secondly, that Hamas would not be compelled to recognize Israel.¹⁶¹ Helga Baumgarten sees the latter step in particular as an opportunity for the peaceful inclusion of Hamas in a possible solution process, but this was destroyed by the classification of the organization as »terrorist« (Myth 6) by the USA in the same period.¹⁶²

Hamas rejected the betrayal of Oslo, as did the overwhelming majority of Palestinian parties — with the exception of the Palestinian People’s Party (the former CP of Palestine), FIDA (a split‐off from the DFLP) and, of course, the Fatah leadership — on the same grounds as everyone else: the Palestinians recognized Israel and got nothing in return except more and more Zionist settlements on their alleged future state territory.¹⁶³

Therefore, the rejection of Oslo is by no means to be equated with a rejection of the so‐called two‐state solution, as it is so often portrayed in the West. On the contrary, the Oslo system has finally made such a solution impossible due to the increasing settlement of the West Bank.¹⁶⁴ In the ensuing years, Hamas also repeatedly declared its willingness to recognize a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, for example in its government program of 2006¹⁶⁵ and in its basic program of 2017.¹⁶⁶ Imad Mustafa even writes: »All statements by the leadership and documents of Hamas since 2006 refer to the two‐state solution within the 1967 borders with regard to a Palestinian state.«¹⁶⁷

In this context, it should first be noted that such a solution is not only an incredibly generous offer by the indigenous Palestinians to the colonial settlers in their country,¹⁶⁸ but also that such a Palestinian state would be significantly smaller than the one envisaged by the UN in 1947: in the wake of the Nakba, the Zionists in fact expanded the territory awarded to them by the United Nations from 56 percent to around 80 percent of all of Palestine through conquest and annexation.¹⁶⁹

It should also be emphasized here that the fact that Hamas is prepared to accept a two‐state solution is not viewed positively by me. I have already stated elsewhere that I consider the so‐called two‐state solution to be politically wrong for various reasons and also completely unrealistic.¹⁷⁰ However, Hamas’s position corresponds more to the phased program advocated by the DFLP between 1973 and 1994 and the PLO between 1974 and 1993,¹⁷¹ and less to the final two‐state solution as officially advocated today by Fatah, the DFLP and some smaller groups.

Ceasefires

In addition, Hamas has repeatedly offered or unilaterally declared ceasefires and has also adhered to them. As a rule, they were broken by direct Israeli attacks on Hamas or other massive provocations from the Zionist side. Alexander Flores writes both with regard to these real ceasefires and Hamas’ promises to agree to a long‐lasting ceasefire with Israel — seen by many observers as de facto recognition of Israel¹⁷² — in return for the evacuation of the territories occupied in 1967 by Zionist troops and settlers: »Experience teaches us that Hamas promises can be relied upon.«¹⁷³

Prisoner exchanges

Incidentally, the hostage‐takings are also an expression of Hamas’ willingness to negotiate: while initially Hamas tended to kill captured soldiers, soon they began to use them to enforce political demands — usually the release of prisoners. Notably, in contrast to the hostages in the Zionist torture prisons, the Israeli prisoners were usually treated completely correctly. (See Myth 6).

Myth 12: »The Hamas Charter says …«

The Charter is the most popular »key witness« used against Hamas, as was also discussed in Myth 4. However, this is less about the content of the Charter, as it is usually brought into play in connection with the accusation of anti‐Semitism against Hamas. (Myth 3) This is more about the importance of the Charter itself.

Completely overrated

In the West, it is often wrongly assumed that the Hamas Charter is the key to understanding the organization. Yet Asseburg,¹⁷⁴ Baumgarten,¹⁷⁵ Felsch,¹⁷⁶ Hroub,¹⁷⁷ Meyer,¹⁷⁸ Mustafa¹⁷⁹ and Ziolkowski,¹⁸⁰ all emphasize that the Charter has long played little or no role in Hamas practice, or indeed had never done so in the first place. Khaled Hroub, for example, writes:

»Ironically, the Charter failed to maintain a central position in Hamas’s political thinking; a few years after its publication it was shunted onto the margins with little reference to its content. It was deemed by many Hamas leaders both inside and outside Palestine to be simplistic and overloaded with claims and arguments that would reflect a naïve, rather than a sophisticated, image of Hamas. In several interviews over the years I have been told by a number of Hamas leaders that the Charter was written by one leading personality in the Gaza Strip, and distributed hastily without enough prior consultation.«¹⁸¹

Helga Baumgarten describes it similarly in a recently published interview.¹⁸² According to her, Hamas members were never obliged to know the charter and it was not disseminated in Palestine after 1988, while it became notorious in the West.¹⁸³ Maximilian Felsch confirms: »In interviews with the author, Hamas supporters as well as Hamas members not infrequently confessed to not knowing about the existence of a founding charter.«¹⁸⁴

There are numerous official positions of the movement that contradict the charter,¹⁸⁵ as well as statements by leading figures that relativize its significance.¹⁸⁶ Azzam Tamimi, who is close to Hamas, described the anti‐Jewish and conspiracy‐theory statements in the charter as »ridiculous.«¹⁸⁷ According to him, a debate arose in the leadership in the first half of the 2000s about the problems of the document, at the end of which »the task of drafting a new charter« emerged.¹⁸⁸

However, this initiative was eventually abandoned.¹⁸⁹ Why? There are various answers to this question. Hroub writes:

To change or replace the Charter, however, would be a very difficult and delicate step, and it is one that Hamas has lacked the courage to take. Hamas leaders fear that such a step would be construed by many as giving up on the basic principles of the movement. What Hamas has resigned itself to do, thus far, is to let the Charter die on its own, moving on and leaving it behind; hoping it will just go away. Yet the cost of simply downplaying its existence remains high.¹⁹⁰

Gilbert Achcar¹⁹¹ and Tilman Seidensticker¹⁹² formulate it similarly. Raif Hussein also mentions this aspect, but adds another: the Muslim Brotherhood as the »mother organization« of Hamas »is not yet ready at this point to support such a course correction by one of its sections […].«¹⁹³

A new charter(?)

However, Hamas already distanced itself from the Muslim Brotherhood in its 2017 declaration of principles. This document also differs fundamentally from the founding charter in key points. For example, it states unequivocally:

»Hamas affirms that its conflict is with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion. Hamas does not wage a struggle against the Jews because they are Jewish but wages a struggle against the Zionists who occupy Palestine. Yet, it is the Zionists who constantly identify Judaism and the Jews with their own colonial project and illegal entity.«¹⁹⁴

Moreover, Hamas no longer addresses Muslims exclusively, but also Christian Palestinians.

However, it is disputed whether the Charter has been replaced by this new document or not. Asseburg,¹⁹⁵ Baconi¹⁹⁶ and Hussein¹⁹⁷ think no and speak of it as a »supplement;« Azzam Tamimi, on the other hand, who has long worked as a consultant for Hamas, declared that the document »practically« replaces the Charter;¹⁹⁸ Hroub also believes that the document is »de facto Hamas’s new charter«¹⁹⁹ and Ali Abunimah²⁰⁰ and Helga Baumgarten²⁰¹ even refer to it simply as a »new Charter«.

High‐ranking Hamas representative Khaled Mash’al, on the other hand, refused to say that the new document invalidates the old charter: »Hamas refuses to submit to the wishes of other states. Its political thought is never the result of pressure from the outside. Our principle is the following: no change of document. Hamas does not forget its past. The Charter illustrates the perod of the 1980s and the Document of General Principles presents our policy in 2017. Each document belongs to a specefic period.«²⁰² The last two sentences, in their contradiction to the above, provide a clue to the intellectual key to this dilemma: in its self‐portrayal (but probably less in its self‐perception), Hamas has not made any historical mistakes, just like the Muslim Brotherhood — real breaks in its history are negated and presented as a harmonious change. This idealization of its own history and the accompanying demonstrative inability to self‐criticism is neither atypical nor inexplicable for political actors, especially in a position such as Hamas, but it is nevertheless problematic and regrettable.

Be that as it may, the basic document from 2017 was also widely received, discussed and interpreted. Both documents are definitely interesting to read, if only to form one’s own opinion. Baumgarten,²⁰³ Hroub,²⁰⁴ Meyer²⁰⁵ and Mustafa²⁰⁶ also provide good discussions of the content and classification of the Charter. Interesting discussions of the basic document can be found online by Abunimah²⁰⁷ and Langthaler,²⁰⁸ among others.

Myth 13: »Hamas is a puppet of Iran.«

This accusation is not only made against Hamas, but also against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ansarallah in Yemen (referred to as »Houthis« in the West) and various actors in Iraq and Syria. Interestingly, it is raised much less frequently (in the West) against Islamic Jihad, although, unlike Hamas, it is much more closely linked to Iran. This can of course be explained, among other things, by the fact that Hamas is significantly larger, stronger and more relevant. But it also simply shows the ignorance in the West towards the Palestinians and their organizations.

In fact, the relationship between Hamas and Iran is quite complex and contradictory and they are anything but »natural« allies. As Leila Seurat writes: »Hamas has looked far and wide to find material backers other than Iran. Support from elsewhere could remove all the inconveniences included in an alliance with the Islamic Republic, an alliances that remains quite unpopular in Palestine.«Salfistists in particular accuse Hamas (as well as Islamic Jihad) of making themselves dependent on »Shiite Persians«. Shaykh Yassin himself had declared as recently as 1989 that Shiites were not (real) Muslims.²⁰⁹

Rapprochement (1990 – 2011)

In the early 1990s, Hamas and Iran came closer together due to various favorable circumstances. Since then, there have been no more confessionalist outbursts of this kind from Hamas representatives. There have also been occasional positive statements about Ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of the »Islamic revolution« but, unlike Hezbollah in its early days, Hamas has never adopted it as its own.²¹⁰ Hamas has remained a movement with Islamic‐reformist, not revolutionary, aspirations.

The rapprochement between Iran and Hamas came at a time when the latter was replacing Fatah as the largest recipient of funds, including from the Arab Gulf monarchies. The background to this was that Hamas, unlike Arafat, did not side with Baghdad in the First Iraq War.²¹¹ This stance was also well received in Iran, as the country had just emerged from an eight‐year, bloody war (Iran‐Iraq War) with its neighbor. Shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, a delegation from the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood traveled to Tehran and asked for weapons (apparently for their brothers and sisters in Palestine) — albeit unsuccessfully. But as early as October 1991, Hamas was officially invited to open an office in Tehran. This step was a first for Hamas; representations in other Muslim countries did not follow until 1993 – 97. According to a secret report for the US Congress from 1993, there were already close military, intelligence and financial ties between Hamas and Tehran at that time. Accordingly, Daud Abdullah counts Iran as one of Hamas’ »closest allies« for this period.²¹²

At the same time, from the end of 1992, hundreds of Hamas members were also staying in Lebanon because the Zionist regime had deported them there. Close contacts with Hezbollah were established then.²¹³

Relations between the Islamic Republic and the Islamic Resistance Movement further picked up speed again in the mid‐2000s.²¹⁴ There were various reasons for this rapprochement: Hamas initially won the elections in the 1967 occupied territories in 2006 and took long‐term power in the Gaza Strip in 2007 (Myth 10), which gave it greater political clout. During the power struggle with Fatah in the course of 2007, Iran helped Hamas to set up and arm combat units.²¹⁵

At the same time, the »axis of resistance« came into increasing confrontation with Western imperialism: Israel and the USA pursued an increasingly aggressive war course against Iran under President Ahmadinejad; the Zionist regime invaded Lebanon in 2006 and had to admit defeat to Hezbollah; in December 2008, the Zionists attacked Gaza and bombed the area for almost a month with the declared aim of destroying Hamas.

According to Seurat, Tehran’s financial support for Hamas after 2006 amounted to an average of 120 million US dollars per year, an »absolutely vital« sum. Beyond such financial support, she also notes the significance of Iran’s transfer of scientific and technological knowledge: » Hamas’ military industry is apparently in full progress courtesy of its close cooperation with Tehran, which also supplies weapons and trains fighters. At organizational level, the movement increasingly resembles Hezbollah.«²¹⁶

Ruptures and rapprochement (2011 to today)

These close relations were severely affected by the war in Syria: The Muslim Brotherhood as a whole was committed to establishing a (non‐Wahhabi) Sunni axis from Tunisia and Libya via Egypt to Gaza, Syria and Turkey, as well as to Qatar. Hamas accordingly sided with the Syrian insurgents, who consisted mainly of Sunnis and included not least the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. According to a background article in The Cradle, Qatar, Turkey and Syrian opposition members put targeted pressure on Hamas head of government Ismail Haniya and politburo member Mousa Abu Marzouk, who were both reluctant to break with the »axis of resistance«, while a circle around the politburo chairman, Khaled Mash’al, had already swung to the »Brotherhood line«.²¹⁷ The »axis of resistance« between Gaza, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran finally broke down along sectarian lines; Mash’al moved the foreign headquarters from Damascus to Doha in 2012. Contrary to previous threats, Tehran did not initially cease all financial and military support for Hamas, but the Iranian leadership cut its funding from 150 million to 75 million US dollars in 2012 and cut it in half again in the summer of 2013, when Hamas fighters took part in a battle against Syrian troops and Hezbollah fighters in Syria. Finally, in 2016, the Hamas leadership claimed that Iran had stopped payments altogether.²¹⁸

Abdullah, on the other hand, writes that Iran never completely ended its support.²¹⁹ In any case, Tehran’s restrictions did not have the effect of bringing Hamas to simply change its political course regarding Syria.

However, with the fall of Muhammad Morsi in Egypt in the summer of 2013 and the strict anti‐Muslim Brotherhood policy of the new military regime and General al‐Sisi, Hamas ran into problems that favored its rapprochement with Iran.²²⁰ This was compounded in 2014 by the electoral losses of the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia, the complete break‐up of Libya as a result of the NATO war, the failure of regime change in Syria, and the isolation of Qatar within the Gulf Cooperation Council, which began in 2014 and culminated in the severing of relations between Doha on the one hand and Abu Dhabi, Cairo, Manama and Riyadh on the other in 2017.²²¹ The Hamas leadership now tried to limit the damage, but Khaled Mash’al in particular, who had been responsible for the course since 2011, was no longer welcome in Tehran. It was not until 2015 that there was a gradual and anything but straightforward rapprochement between Hamas on the one side and Iran and Hezbollah on the other.²²²

The Qassam Brigades played a special role in all of this: due to the financial and military support they received from Iran, they were strictly against any course that led to a break with the »axis of resistance« from the outset. And indeed, the political line in the years after 2011 brought setbacks for the people and the resistance in Gaza, as much less money flowed from Doha — which despite everything maintains good relations with Washington — and Ankara — a NATO member — as had previously been coming from Tehran.²²³

However, Iran’s continued support for the armed wing of Hamas has not only strengthened it militarily, but also politically, thus expanding its power and that of the leadership in Gaza as a whole. Traditionally, the »external leadership«, i.e. the part of the leadership that lived outside Palestine, held political hegemony in the organization owing to the Zionist occupation and later reinforced by the enforced isolation of Gaza. The chairman of the politburo had come from their ranks for decades.²²⁴ This changed in 2017, when Yahya al‐Sinwar, one of the co‐founders of the Brigades, replaced Haniya as Prime Minister of Gaza, and Haniya in turn was elected to succeed Mash’al as head of the politburo. This was the first time that the center of power of Hamas was moved back to Gaza since 2004, when the assassination of the two Hamas leaders Shaykh Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi by Tel Aviv shifted power in favor of the foreign leadership. In this regard, Abdelrahman Nassar speaks of a »military wing« consisting of the Qassam Brigades and other leaders who are currently asserting themselves against a second pole around Mash’al, a kind of »Muslim Brother pole«, as well as a third, Salafi confessionalist pole, and are pushing for a rapprochement with the »Axis of the Resistance«.²²⁵ This »military wing« could also be referred to as the »national pole« or the »Axis of Resistance pole«, depending on its content, due to the fact that it focuses on the national liberation of Palestine and pursues a multi‐confessional, anti‐sectarian alliance policy in the region.

A proxy war by Tehran?

If we look at the events since October 7, we see on the one hand that such an »axis of resistance« has indeed (re)taken shape in a certain way, and that, as before 2011, it is once again on the one hand majority Shiite (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Ansarallah and Hezbollah) and on the other hand interdenominational (Twelver Shia in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, Zaidites in Yemen, Alavites in Syria, Sunnis in Palestine). The wounds and scars inflicted in Syria are currently being covered up by the »Al‐Aqsa flood« and the blood pouring out of Gaza.

On the other hand, it does not appear that the uprising of October 7 was closely coordinated between Gaza and the »axis«. There are not only indications that the decision to launch the operation was »one hundred percent Palestinian«, as Hezbollah Secretary General Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah put it,²²⁶ but also that Tehran was not at all enthusiastic about the offensive: Reuters reported on 15 November: » Iran’s supreme leader delivered a clear message to the head of Hamas when they met in Tehran in early November, according to three senior officials: You gave us no warning of your Oct. 7 attack on Israel and we will not enter the war on your behalf.«²²⁷

Even though Hamas and a high‐ranking spokesman for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards immediately denied the report,²²⁸ this report could be an indication of tactical or even strategic disagreements between Gaza and Tehran.

Hamas: a relatively independent actor

In any case, it seems obvious that the relationship between Hamas and Iran is complex and by no means free of contradictions. To describe Hamas as a »puppet« of Iran is therefore completely absurd. In a sharp polemic, Seurat rejects such insinuations as based, not on facts, but on unscientific and downright colonialist suspicions and prejudices that only serve the goal of discrediting Hamas.²²⁹

Hamas must obviously be understood first and foremost in terms of the history and society of Palestine from which it originates. (See Chapter 3 and Myth 1) Its policies are primarily determined by the dynamics of the Palestinian liberation struggle and the interests of the sections of the population it represents. Ideology (myth 2) and foreign policy influences are secondary to this, although of course not unimportant.

Hamas is definitely dependent on foreign actors. However, this statement is relative. Ultimately, this applies to every relevant political actor and especially to every state that operates on the international political and economic stage. Non‐state actors, especially national liberation movements, are fundamentally more dependent, because as long as they are not victorious, they generally do not have their own state and their resources are therefore limited. The relative independence of these actors lies above all in their self‐confidence, not allowing themselves to be harnessed to another actor’s cart, and pursuing their own interests through diplomacy instead of selling them out in favor of the interests of others. Without wanting to endorse it, Hamas has at least shown with its Syria policy since 2011 that it puts its (supposed) interests above relations with Tehran or Damascus when it deems it necessary, just as it has qualified its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood in its new basic document from 2017. (Myth 12)

For more weapons and more money from Tehran!

So much for the facts. Finally, I would like to break a lance in favor of Iran’s support for Hamas: In its function as a supplier of money and weapons, and as a political and military protecting power for the Islamic resistance — and, thus for the leading force in the Palestinian liberation movement — Iran has in a way inherited the role of the Soviet Union. The latter had primarily supported Fatah, but also the PFLP and the DFLP.²³⁰

This was despite the fact that none of these forces were sister parties of the CPSU and although there were certainly critiques from Moscow of the respective policies of these organizations. Iran takes a similar approach: not only Islamic Jihad, which is ideologically close to Iran, but also Hamas and, incidentally, the DFLP²³¹ and the PFLP²³² receive financial and military aid from Tehran. So, it is not simply a question of ideological similarities, but of strategic and tactical cooperation.

Left‐wingers usually argue that Iran is not a socialist country but a bourgeois regime, that it is not acting out of »kindness« but out of power‐political calculation, etc. Yes — and in fact also no. The Islamic Republic is a capitalist country under the rule of a bourgeois regime that blatantly suppresses social revolutionary forces. But it also emerged from an anti‐imperialist popular revolution against the Pahlavi regime, which was dependent on the West; Khomeini’s seizure of power was not the (complete) counter‐revolution that many on the left portray it to be. Although many achievements of this revolution have been lost and continue to be lost, one that has survived so far is the pronounced anti‐imperialism in the form of, above all, »anti‐Americanism« and anti‐Zionism. For Western liberals and unfortunately also many Western leftists, this »political culture« is nothing but folklore and above all »reactionary« through and through. In reality, however, it is an expression of a political consciousness that dates back to the time of the revolution and is still alive in parts of the Iranian masses. Moreover, this anti‐imperialism is not narrowly nationalistic, but tends to be internationalist. So it is actually more than just »niceness;« it is the »tenderness of the peoples«, as Che Guevara so beautifully put it. And this tenderness is a promise that was made to the masses during the revolution. Not everyone is still demanding this promise today; and many other promises have already been broken. But it is indeed this political consciousness in still significant parts of the people that is forcing the Iranian regime to stand with the Palestinians against the US and Israel and beyond.

In addition, there are of course Iran’s own regional and geopolitical interests, which it pursues through its alliance policy in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. But this policy is also anti‐Western and therefore always anti‐imperialist, at least to some extent, because the Iranian people’s revolution was anti‐Western and anti‐imperialist. In any case, the Iranian bourgeoisie as such would make life much easier for itself if it dropped anti‐imperialism and the Palestinians and sought a handshake with the West. And there are certainly enough circles within Iran’s ruling class that are more than willing to do so. There are also quite a few Iranians who completely reject support for the Palestinians, often making chauvinistic and anti‐Arab arguments and pointing to the high financial and political costs.

What does all this tell us? Iranian aid cannot be taken for granted. And at the same time, the Palestinian liberation movement is very much dependent on it. The solution cannot be to »demand« that the Palestinians stop relying on forces like Iran. That is not a demand, but a wish. And how could it come true without their own state with heavy industry? All that remains is the »criticism« that it is somehow problematic that the Palestinian resistance is so dependent. This in turn is not constructive criticism, but a statement that is as correct as it is empty. So, what is the »solution«? »The« short‐term solution does not exist. We have to accept the world as it is. And the world currently looks as if Iran is not only the Palestinians’ most reliable partner, but rather the only one that is able and willing to support them in such a comprehensive way. Its help is generous, not least because the Iranian people demand this act of international solidarity and are prepared to make sacrifices for it. The long‐term solution, of course, lies in the national liberation of Palestine. And at the moment, every rial, every cartridge, and every rocket that goes from Tehran to Palestine is a practical contribution to this.

From our limited options for action in Germany, we can only hope for the time being: Namely, that no pro‐imperialist counter‐revolution takes place in Iran, that the people do not lose their tenderness for the Palestinians, and that Tehran is able and willing to send more and more weapons and more money to the resistance, to support it politically, and to educate it militarily. The task facing us in Germany is clear: we must support the struggle of those sections of the Iranian people who have not given up their anti‐imperialist course, just as we must support the Palestinians’ struggle for liberation. Because both struggles are connected. And this also includes defending Iranian support for the Palestinians politically against attacks.

Myth 14: »Hamas is fighting the Palestinian left.«

The time of the Muslim Brotherhood

In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Gaza, as in other Arab countries, was not only in competition with the political left, but also openly opposed it in certain phases and sometimes even militantly fought against it. However, there were also repeated examples of the opposite, for example when the MB in Palestine cooperated with the communists, among others, after the Second World War.²³³

Although the Gaza Strip was a traditional stronghold of the MB, the PFLP and the Communist Party were also relatively strong there in the 1970s and 1980s, which brought them into competition with the MB. In the meantime, the Brotherhood used violence against both: In December 1979, for example, a Muslim Brotherhood candidate — incidentally with the support of Fatah, which also saw the leftists as competition that needed to be weakened — ran against the chairman of the Red Crescent, who was close to the Communists. When the MB candidate was defeated, his supporters rioted in Crescent offices, stores and cafés selling alcohol, movie theaters, etc. The IOF intervened very late. Similar incidents occurred in the following years, not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank, with nationalist forces increasingly becoming targets or opponents alongside decidedly left‐wing forces.²³⁴

Notably, this sectarian violence against Palestinians coincided with the MB’s abstention from any resistance to the Zionists. It is thus quite clear that it was objectively acting in Israel’s interests. The fact that the colonial power at least passively supported this behavior has already been described in Myth 1; just like the fact that Hamas represented a break with this anti‐ppopular, not to say unpatriotic, policy.

Hamas and the left

A rapprochement with the PFLP came even faster than with Fatah due to their common »uncompromising« stance: as early as the beginning of 1990, PFLP Secretary General George Habash declared that anyone comparing the positions of the old Muslim Brotherhood and the early Hamas »with its position today, after the intifada, cannot but notice a huge difference and has to welcome warmly its joining the nationalist movement.« There is »no doubt that the participation of Hamas. There can be no doubt but that the participation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the battle is a victory for the nationalist struggle and a boost to the popular uprising.«²³⁵

In 1991/92, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, DFLP, the Revolutionary Communist Party and six other organizations formed an alliance of rejection against the looming Oslo betrayal.²³⁶ During the 2005 municipal elections, Hamas also supported a Christian mayoral candidate close to the PFLP.²³⁷ And after the 2006 election victory, Hamas asked all parties, including the PFLP, the DFLP and the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP) — the former Communist Party — to work with it in a government of national unity.²³⁸ All three initially refused, however, until the DFLP and PPP finally joined such a government brokered by Saudi Arabia in spring 2007.²³⁹ The PFLP, on the other hand, continued to boycott it: it »supported« the first Hamas government, but did not join it due to differences regarding Hamas’ stance on the PLO and the refugee issue. Although it welcomed the Mecca Agreement between Fatah and Hamas due to the temporary settlement of the power struggle, it also saw this as Hamas giving in to the Oslo course.²⁴⁰

Tensions between the organizations of the Palestinian left and Hamas arose above all around the issue of Hamas’ attitude towards the PLO. (See Myth 9) However, due to the fact that the PLO was and still is dominated by the Fatah leadership, and that this in turn has mutated into a treacherous puppet regime since Oslo and even more so since 2007, the question of who is in the right here cannot be answered unequivocally: Hamas disregarded the PLO from the outset, and indeed for the wrong reasons. The fact that the PLO has actually lost much of its legitimacy over time only reinforced this attitude. »The left‐wing factions«, on the other hand, ‘never questioned their membership of the PLO’, as Raif Hussein notes. »They had to be careful not to become accomplices in the abolition of the Palestinian people’s greatest achievement.«²⁴¹

»For its part, Hamas despaired of the left because whenever and wherever Hamas clashed on the ground with Fatah, the left would either stay neutral or implicitly support Fatah,« as Khaled Hroub describes the counter‐perspective. He notes further that²⁴² »after the elections of January 2006, Hamas’s relationship with the Palestinian left have further deteriorated. None of the three small leftist groups which won seven seats in total in the PLC agreed to join Hamas’s government. Hamas blamed them for foiling its efforts to form a national coalition government.«²⁴³ and thus ultimately also for the power struggle with Fatah, which led to the split between Gaza and Ramallah. (Myth 10) The left must indeed wear this shoe. And even during the power struggle between Hamas and Fatah, the PFLP clearly positioned itself against Hamas and condemned the »coup d’état.«²⁴⁴

Since then, however, the relationship has improved significantly. As early as 2011, Hroub speaks of »closer relationships« with the PFLP and DFLP.²⁴⁵ In recent years in particular, the Islamic and left‐wing liberation organizations have grown ever closer on the basis of their joint resistance to the Zionist and Oslo regimes: Leftist and Islamic students carry out joint actions at universities in the West Bank,²⁴⁶ communists and Islamists fight side by side in cross‐organizational and cross‐current brigades in the West Bank²⁴⁷ and the same is true in Gaza within the framework of the Joint Operations Room of the resistance factions as well as the »Al‐Aqsa Flood.« Organizations such as the prisoner solidarity network Samidoun or information projects such as Resistance News Networks are also an expression of these cross‐current unity efforts.

The relationship between the left‐wing forces and Hamas is characterized by the all‐dominant strategic question of the national liberation of Palestine. Neither Hamas nor the left have answered this question flawlessly in the past. It would therefore be absurd to accuse Hamas of having acted differently from the PFLP or DFLP on this or that issue, or even of having fought them on it. Hamas’ criticism of the non‐participation of the two parties in the formation of the government in 2006, for example, was justified and their behavior in the power struggle between Hamas and Fatah must also be criticized in retrospect.

Conclusion

Therefore, the accusation that Hamas is »fighting« the political left can be reduced either a) to the time of the Muslim Brotherhood or b) to a possible future, always according to the motto: »You can’t trust the Islamists!«

(An insertion here: the dictum that »the Islamists« will betray the communists as soon as they can is cited by many on the left as a »lesson« from the Iranian revolution. All I can say to that is: that’s not how historical lessons work. The lesson of the November Revolution was not to cooperate with social democracy; the lesson of fascism was to do so. So which is right? Both to a certain extent. These lessons must not be unduly generalized. First of all, there is historical experience and I doubt that all those who speak of the »historical lesson of the Iranian revolution« are so well versed in this subject that they can actually draw lessons from it. Whether comrades who are actually well versed in the subject in turn draw the right lessons depends in the second step on whether they approach the world dogmatically and schematically or scientifically and dialectically.)

Or c) to the banal observation that Hamas is a bourgeois force with which left‐wing or communist actors must fundamentally adopt a relationship of class opposition and with which they must struggle for social hegemony. However, this does not distinguish Hamas from other bourgeois liberation organizations, such as Fatah in the 1960s to 1980s, the ANC before the end of apartheid, etc. The suspicion therefore inevitably arises that it is once again a matter of latent Islamophobia when this »argument« is used. For in the case of secular bourgeois organizations in the context of national liberation, this objection is heard much less frequently. (See also Myth 7) The PFLP and DFLP, or so it seems, have fortunately shed this leftist disease of Islamophobia and anti‐Islamic chauvinism. Otherwise, it would be almost impossible for them to gain mass influence in a society like the Palestinian one, let alone achieve political hegemony.

Myth 15: »October 7 was a terrorist attack by Hamas.«

This accusation is also made in other variations: October 7 was a »massacre«, a »pogrom« and so on. These formulations are aimed at implicitly or explicitly accusing the Palestinian resistance of terror or war crimes (Myth 6) and anti‐Semitism (Myth 3).

General Assessment

1) The »Al‐Aqsa Flood« was or is first and foremost a military operation led by Hamas: it began as an offensive that broke out of the open‐air prison of Gaza and brought sections of Palestine which had been occupied since 1948 under the control of the Palestinian resistance for a number of hours. In the process, military targets were attacked, destroyed or captured and hundreds of Israeli combatants were killed or arrested. All of this is undoubtedly justified by international law, morally legitimate and politically sound.

2) At the same time, it was an armed popular uprising that was joined by other resistance groups in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Additionally, Palestinian non‐combatants also participated in it, both in the form of attacks on soldiers and settlers and in the form of demonstrations.

3) Moreover, the »flood« has had an impact far beyond the borders of Palestine. As a result, it has the potential to become a conflagration that threatens both the US presence in the region and the Zionist colonial regime as such.

4) At present, however, the »Al‐Aqsa flood« is, above all, a defensive battle for Gaza and against the genocide that the Zionist regime has been carrying out there since October.

War crimes

On the general question of civilians, see Myth 6.

Otherwise, it should only be emphasized here that the reports of atrocities such as (mass) rape, beheaded or oven‐burned infants, etc., some of which are still being spread by the German lying press today, have long been relegated to the realm of myths, not least by the Israeli media.²⁴⁸ It has long been known that many of the non‐combatants killed on the Israeli side can be attributed to the Zionist army itself and its infamous »Hannibal Doctrine«, according to which a dead Israeli is better than one in Palestinian captivity. Some articles also point out that in addition to the fighters of the Qassam and other Palestinian brigades, numerous »normal« Palestinians also broke out of the Gaza Strip, and that it is quite possible that among these people were some whose hatred of the settlers, which had built up over the years, turned into unbridled violence.

Among others, the articles by The Electronic Intifada,²⁴⁹ Mondoweiss,²⁵⁰ Occupied News,²⁵¹ and The Cradle,²⁵² which dispel numerous myths surrounding October 7, are recommended. Hamas itself has also taken a stand on the accusations of war crimes: it has repeatedly rejected them, though in its statement of January 21, 2024, it also admitted that improper actions may have occurred in connection with the uprising and the ensuing chaos: »Maybe some faults happened during Operation Al‐Aqsa Flood’s implementation due to the rapid collapse of the Israeli security and military system, and the chaos caused along the border areas with Gaza.«²⁵³

Wars of liberation are also wars. They are also ugly and violent. The liberation from fascism was accompanied by, among other things, the carpet bombing of major German cities and the rape of thousands of German women and girls. Nevertheless, no one except out‐and‐out fascists and historical revisionists would deny that the Allies first and foremost liberated Germany, Europe and the world from German fascism.

Other Actors

The widespread narrative in the West that the »Al‐Aqsa flood« was »Hamas assault« is evidence of the narrow‐mindedness of the local discourse and is ultimately an anti‐Palestinian propaganda phrase.

The truth is that, in addition to Hamas, all other resistance organizations in the Gaza Strip are or have been involved to this day. A spokesman for the left‐wing Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) explained, for example, with regard to the National Resistance Brigades, the armed arm of the DFLP: »The Brigades took part in Operation ‘Al‐Aqsa Flood’ one hour after Hamas began and fired several rocket salvos. On the first day, seven comrades were martyred.«²⁵⁴ According to Dieter Reinisch, by early November the DFLP and PFLP had already »lost around two dozen members each.«²⁵⁵

The start of the operation was apparently not coordinated with the other resistance groups in the Gaza Strip, nor with those in the West Bank, nor with the allies in Lebanon and Iran (see Myth 13). Nevertheless, it resonated everywhere: since then, there have been countless other battles in the West Bank, although these are clearly dwarfed by the scale of what is happening in Gaza.

From abroad, the »Al‐Aqsa flood« is flanked by operations by the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Yemeni Ansarallah and other armed groups in Iraq and Syria. Armed solidarity actions also took place in Egypt.²⁵⁶ And in October, hundreds of volunteers from Iraq traveled to the Jordanian‐Palestinian border, demanding to be allowed to cross over to help their brothers and sisters in the fight. Solidarity demonstrations also took place in numerous Arab and Muslim countries, the largest of which were in Yemen and Indonesia. But there were also demonstrations in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan, where extremely repressive and openly pro‐Zionist regimes are in power — in some cases, participants had to pay with imprisonment in the torture prisons of these dictatorships.

4 Conclusion: Why we must fight against the Hamas ban!

Anyone who has read through the above text should be aware by the time they reach this point that a ban on Hamas is not an »anti‐fascist victory«, as the MLPD presumably see it, and that this ban cannot simply be a matter of indifference to communist, left‐wing and democratic organizations just because it has not affected any »progressive« organization. On the contrary, this ban is a blatant attack on the Palestinian liberation movement as a whole, because it completely criminalizes the most important and politically and militarily strongest resistance force in the country.

We know how far these bans can be interpreted, especially from the repression against the Kurdish movement. It is not just a question of (alleged) members of Hamas — which is not even active in this country — being restricted or prosecuted. Rather, it can affect anyone who speaks out in favor of the Palestinians’ legitimate right to resist. Even a lack of distancing, or public questioning of the propaganda, or so‐called »sympathy promotion,« or criticism of the bans, or solidarity with those affected by repression, etc. — all of this can and will be used by the authorities against us as a Palestine solidarity movement. The fact that Samidoun was also banned in the same breath as Hamas is living proof. For although the comrades were ultimately officially treated as an appendage of the PFLP, in the propaganda show surrounding this ban — and this is what counts above all, because it was never about truth or arguments, but just a lot of noise and a lot of lies — they were constantly moved into the vicinity of Hamas, i.e., the only Palestinian organization that the German mainstream still knows today in its complete narrow‐mindedness.

Incidentally, this must also be recognized by those parts of the communist, left‐wing, Palestine solidarity, and peace movements that do not share all or perhaps any of the arguments put forward in this text regarding the 15 myths discussed here. Even someone who rejects Hamas outright, does not support Palestinian armed resistance, and does not support a one‐state solution must recognize two things: 1. the outright criminalization of Palestinian resistance can only serve to undermine any just solution in Palestine, regardless of what that solution may ultimately look like. 2. this criminalization will not only affect Hamas itself — ultimately perhaps even least of all Hamas, because — thank God, one might say — it is not dependent on Germany and, as I said, is not active here at all. Rather, it will affect the Palestine solidarity movement and is an attack on the basic democratic rights of us all. Because with the current bans, restrictions, mass denunciations etc., all of which cannot be separated from the criminalization of Hamas, facts and precedents are being created. We ourselves are now in a defensive battle for our basic rights; an offense is the best defense! Let us resolutely move forward and fight for the decriminalization of the entire Palestinian resistance and thus for the decriminalization of international solidarity and anti‐imperialist positions!

On that note:

Defend and fight for fundamental democratic rights!
Down with the bans on Hamas and Samidoun!
Down with paragraphs 129 a and b of the German Penal Law Book! Down with the EU terror list!

Long live the Palestinian resistance!
Long live the tenderness of peoples!
Long live international solidarity!

5 Appendix: Recommended Reading

There are handful of decent texts and books on Hamas, even in German. I rely not insignificantly on these works, recommend them to all those who want to deal with the subject objectively, and will therefore not pretend that this text is the first and only useful one on the subject. What I present here is not a comprehensive analysis of Hamas, but rather a targeted refutation of the most common myths about it.

Books

All the titles listed below can be found in the attached bibliography and list of sources.

The two standard German works on this topic — i.e. Helga Baumgarten (2006 and 2013) and Khaled Hroub (2010)—are recommended. They provide comprehensive insights into Hamas’ prehistory; its organizational, political and ideological development; its internal debates; and its character. Furthermore, both authors do not hold back their respective opinions. Baumgarten proceeds chronologically, whereas Hroub’s book deals with a series of questions, similar to the present text.

The English‐language books by Hroub (2002) and Tareq Baconi (2018) are also suitable as an introduction. While the latter relies on extensive programmatic text sources from Hamas, Hroub repeatedly draws on insider information from the organization. The same applies to Azzam Tamimi (2007 a), who is considered an unofficial advisor to Hamas abroad.²⁵⁷

The books by Imad Mustafa (2013) and Henrik Meyer (2010) are considerably less comprehensive, but certainly suitable as an introduction — although they only devote individual chapters to Hamas, and also deal with other political‐Islamic organizations.

Relatively new are the two basic works on Hamas’ foreign policy by Daud Abdullah (2020) and Leila Seurat (2019).

Britt Ziolkowski’s (2020) study on the role of women in Hamas takes a look at an interesting and largely neglected aspect of the organization. The book stands out for its objectivity and surprisingly critical sympathy — not in the least because the author now works for the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Trans. note: German domestic intelligence agency).

I would decidedly not recommend the book by Joseph Croitoru (2007). It is no coincidence that the book by the German‐Israeli author has not only been printed by the Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb), but is also being republished by C.H. Beck‐Verlag for the spring of 2024. This makes this book, which not only follows a clear anti‐Hamas stance but also contains factual errors,²⁵⁸ the official »standard work« on the Islamic resistance movement in German‐speaking countries. This state of affairs testifies not only to our intellectual and political poverty on this subject, but also to the extent to which the German ruling class has fully committed to an anti‐Palestinian course.

Online articles

If you want to acquire a sound basic knowledge, there is no getting around books. However, the following texts can be recommended to serve as a good first introduction, realistic assessments, and factual analyses (especially for people who want to be encouraged to think more critically and who don’t want to buy a book but would click on a link): The article by Karin Leukefeld published in the Unsere Zeit in November 2023,²⁵⁹ the article by the Marx21 editorial team from October 2023.²⁶⁰ and the interview with Tareq Baconi, which also appeared in Jacobin in November 2023.²⁶¹

Media

In addition, analyses, reports and research on the ongoing development of Hamas are of course extremely important. Arab media such as Al‐Jazeera, Al‐Mayadeen, Middle East Eye, Middle East Monitor, Palestinian Information Center, Quds News Network or The Palestine Chronicle, Iranian media such as Press TV as well as The Cradle, Mondoweiss, The Electronic Intifada, Red or Russia Today repeatedly provide interesting material in English.

There is much less on offer in German. Pars Today, the Yemeni news agency Saba, and the Qatar News Agency have German‐language sites. There is also the well‐known RT Deutsch and less well‐known TRT Deutsch. Die Linke Zeitung and Magazin der Masse (MagMa) also translate interesting articles from time to time, for example from The Cradle, Al‐Mayadeen or The Electronic Intifada. Last but not least, Occupied News is recommended here, which, contrary to what the name suggests, is a German medium and does very good work.

Sources

As Hamas has recently been subjected to increased repression and, as a result, stricter censorship in Germany, sources are not so easily accessible: their website is only accessible via VPN and the Telegram channels of Hamas and the Qassam Brigades are blocked for German phone numbers. Moreover, Hamas statements are repeatedly mirrored or at least quoted by media and Telegram channels such as Quds News Network, The Cradle, the Resistance News Network, as well as international press agencies such as AFP, AP, IRNA, Qatar News Agency, Reuters, Saba or Tass.

It is probably no coincidence that only the infamous Hamas Charter of 1988, which is discussed in Myth 12, can be found in German on Zionist sites; I have not checked these translations and therefore cannot judge them. A commendable and complete translation in German can be found in the appendix of Baumgarten’s work.²⁶² Hamas’ 2017 policy paper, which some interpret as the new Hamas Charter (also Myth 12), can now also be found online in German as an unauthorized translation.²⁶³ Likewise for the statement published on 21 January 2024: »Our view of Operation Al‐Aqsa Flood.«²⁶⁴ The credit for the translation and publication of these two important sources goes to the MagMa. In addition, Baumgarten has also printed Hamas’s 2006 election program, with which it won the parliamentary elections at the time.²⁶⁵ Mustafa has published a position statement by Hamas’ politburo chief Khaled Mash’al on the so‐called Arab Spring of 2011 and a Hamas press release on the Syrian war from 2013 translated into German.²⁶⁶

This more or less covers all of the sources on Hamas translated into German, which says a lot about the limited discourse in this country. In English, on the other hand, you can of course find countless interviews, press releases and other Hamas sources, if not via Google, then specifically via Arabic, Iranian and Turkish media, especially those listed above.

List of Literature

Abuheweila, Iyad/Kershner, Isabel: ISIS Declares War on Hamas, and Gaza Families Disown Sons in Sinai (2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/world/middleeast/isis-hamas-sinai.html.

Abunimah, Ali: What’s behind Hamas’ new charter? (2017), https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/whats-behind-hamas-new-charter.

Achcar, Gilbert: Die Araber und der Holocaust. Der arabisch‐israelische Krieg der Geschichtsschreibungen, Nautilus Verlag (2012). English Version: The Arabs and the Holocaust. The Arab‐Israeli War of Narratives, New York: Metropolitan Books (2010)

AlDailami, Said: Jemen. Der vergessene Krieg, C.H. Beck (2019).

AlJazeera: Hamas accepts Palestinian state with 1967 borders, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/5/2/hamas-accepts-palestinian-state-with-1967-borders.

Al‐Monitor: Iran Increases Aid to PFLP Thanks to Syria Stance (2013), https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2013/09/iran-pflp-gaza-palestine-syria.html.

Asseburg, Muriel: Die palästinensische Hamas zwischen Widerstandsbewegung, Partei und Regierung, in: Muriel Asseburg (Hrsg.): Moderate Islamisten als Reformakteure?, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2008), S. 81 – 98.

Asseburg, Muriel: Palästina und die Palästinenser. Eine Geschichte von der Nakba bis zur Gegenwart, C.H. Beck (2021).

Baconi, Tareq: Hamas Contained. The Rise and Pacification of Palestinian Resistance, Stanford University Press (2018).

Baconi, Tareq: How Hamas Became the Violent Face of Palestinian Resistance (2023), https://jacobin.com/2023/11/hamas-israel-palestine-gaza-history-decolonization-violence.

Baker, Fouad: »Im Zentrum steht die Beendigung der Besatzung» (2024), https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/466488.palästinensischer-widerstand-im-zentrum-steht-die-beendigung-der-besatzung.html.

Bamen, Noel: Mit palästina‐solidarischen Vorsätzen in die zionistische Hölle: Eine Kritik an den „Grundlinien» der MLPD zum palästinensischen Befreiungskampf (2023), https://kommunistische-organisation.de/artikel/mit-palaestina-solidarischen-vorsaetzen-in-die-zionistische-hoelle-eine-kritik-an-den-grundlinien-der-mlpd-zum-palaestinensischen-befreiungskampf/.

Bamen, Noel: Weder Verrat noch Utopismus, sondern nationale Befreiung! Zur Debatte um die Ein‐ und Zweistaatenlösung für Palästina (2023), https://kommunistische-organisation.de/artikel/weder-verrat-noch-utopismus-sondern-nationale-befreiung-zur-debatte-um-die-ein-und-zweistaatenloesung-fuer-palaestina/.

Baumgarten, Helga: Hamas. Der politische Islam in Palästina, Diederichs (2006).

Baumgarten, Helga: Hamas — Interview mit der Zeitschrift International (2024), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bj6qRZ_IjuA.

Baumgarten, Helga: Kampf um Palästina. Was wollen Hamas und Fatah?, Herder (2013).

Baumgarten, Helga: Kein Frieden für Palästina. Krieg in Gaza, Besatzung und Widerstand, Promedia (2021).

Beaumont, Peter: Hamas destroys al‐Qaida group in violent Gaza battle (2009), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/15/hamas-battle-gaza-islamists-al-qaida.

Brenner, Lenni: Zionismus und Faschismus. Über die unheimliche Zusammenarbeit von Faschisten und Zionisten, Kai Homilius Verlag (2007). English Version: Zionism in the Age of the Dictators. A Reappraisal (1983). Online: https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/document/mideast/agedict/index.htm

Brentjes, Burchard: Geheimoperation Nahost. Zur Vorgeschichte der Zusammenarbeit von Mossad und BND, Edition Ost (2001).

Channel 13 (2024), https://t.me/MiddleEastEye_TG/2400.

Croitoru, Joseph: Hamas. Die islamische Kampf um Palästina, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2007).

Duden: Terror, https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Terror.

Filiu, Jean‐Pierre: The Origins of Hamas. Militant Legacy or Israeli Tool? (2012), https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/jps/v41i3/f_0025591_20939.pdf.

Flores, Alexander: Arabischer Antisemitismus in westlicher Perspektive, in: John Bunzl /Alexandra Senfft (Hrsg.): Zwischen Antisemitismus und Islamophobie, VSA (2008), S. 145 – 159.

Flores, Alexander: Der Palästinakonflikt. Wissen, was stimmt, Herder (2009).

Flores, Alexander: Intifada. Aufstand der Palästinenser, Rotbuch Verlag (1988).

Gershoni, Israel /Nordbruch, Götz: Sympathie und Schrecken. Begegnungen mit Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus in Ägypten, 1922 – 1937, Klaus Schwarz Verlag (2011).

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Hajjaj, Tareq S.: What it means to be a government and a resistance movement (2023), https://mondoweiss.net/2023/07/what-it-means-to-be-a-government-and-a-resistance-movement/.

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Hamas: The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (1988), translated by Raphael Israeli. https://irp.fas.org/world/para/docs/880818.htm

Hamas: »Our Narrative… Operation Al‐Aqsa Flood« (2024) https://www.palestinechronicle.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/PDF.pdf

Hamas: Unsere Sicht der Operation „Al‐Aqsa‐Flut» (2024), https://magma-magazin.su/2024/01/uebersetzungsdienst/unsere-sicht-der-operation-al-aqsa-flut/.

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Reuters: Insight: Iran’s „Axis of Resistance» against Israel faces trial by fire, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023 – 11‐15/.

Robinson, Glenn E.: Hamas as a Social Movement (2004), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Glenn-Robinson‑2/publication/292494431_Hamas_as_social_Movement/links/5d5d9eada6fdcc55e81edb86/Ha mas-as-social-Movement.pdf.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), HTTP://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024 – 05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf

Rote Fahne: MLPD — Grundlinien der Positionierung zum palästinensischen Befreiungskampf (2022), https://www.rf-news.de/rote-fahne/2022/nr23/mlpd-grundlinien-der-positionierung-zum-palaestinensischen-befreiungskampf.

Scher, Brent: The Real History Behind Netanyahu’s Holocaust Comments. An interview with Dr. Wolfgang G. Schwanitz (2015), https://www.meforum.org/5581/schwanitz-interview.

Seidensticker, Tilman: Islamismus. Geschichte, Vordenker, Organisationen, C.H. Beck (3. Auflage 2015).

Seurat, Leila: The Foreign Policy of Hamas. Ideology, Decision Making and Political Supremacy, I.B. Taurus (2019).

Singh, Rishika: Which countries recognise Hamas as a „terrorist» organisation? (2023), https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/everyday-explainers/israel-countries-recognise-hamas-terrorist-list-9036186/.

Staff, Toi: Hamas claims to arrest senior Islamic State leaders in Gaza (2017), https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-arrests-senior-islamic-state-leaders-in-gaza-report/.

Tamimi, Azzam: Hamas. A History from Within, Olive Branch Press (2007).

Tamimi, Azzam: Hamas. Unwritten Chapters, C. Hurst & Co (2007).

The Cradle: „Regime change» in Hamas and a return to Syria (2022), https://new.thecradle.co/articles/regime-change-in-hamas-and-a-return-to-syria. Deutsche Übersetzung: https://linkezeitung.de/2022/09/28/regimewechsel-bei-der-hamas-und-ihre-rueckkehr-nach-syrien/.

Van Wegenen, William: How Israeli forces trapped and killed ravers at the Nova Festival (2024), https://thecradle.co/articles/how-israeli-forces-trapped-and-killed-ravers-at-the-nova-festival. Deutsche Übersetzung: https://linkezeitung.de/2024/01/14/wie-israelische-streitkraefte-raver-auf-dem-nova-festival-gefangen-hielten-und-toeteten/.

Van Wegenen, William: Israel’s 43‐minute Hamas atrocity video exposed (2023 a), https://thecradle.co/articles/israels-43-minute-hamas-atrocity-video-exposed. .

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List of References

1
The only exception I am aware of is Palästina Solidarität Duisburg (2023).
2
MLPD (2023 a).
3
Rote Fahne (2022).
4
Kommunistische Organisation (2023).
5
Kommunistische Organisation (2020).
6
Bamen (2023 a). Bamen (2023 b).
7
The booklets on the topic by both Johansen (1982) and Harman (1994) are worth reading, even if Hamas is not mentioned in either of them.
8
Baumgarten (2006), p. 10.
9
Johansen (1982), p. 27. Seidensticker (2015), p. 72.
10
Baumgarten (2006), p. 11 f.
11
Gershoni / Nordbruch (2011), p. 219 f.
12
Baumgarten (2006), pp. 12-14, 18-20.
13
Ibid. p. 17.
14
Ibid. pp. 21-28, quote from p. 27.
15
Arafat himself was probably never a member of the MB, but maintained close contacts with it, fought in its ranks in Palestine in 1948 and was a member or even chairman of organizations close to it.
16
Baumgarten (2006), p. 29 f.
17
Ibid. pp. 31-34.
18
Mustafa (2013), p. 122.
19
Baumgarten (2013), p. 64.
20
Ibid. p. 65.
21
Ibid. p. 66.
22
Filiu (2012), p. 64.
23
Flores (2009), p. 95 f.
24
Baumgarten (2006), pp. 34 – 36, 45, 49 f. Hroub (2011), p. 41 f. [English edition: (2010), p. 11]. Filiu (2012), p. 66.
25
Robinson (2004), p. 123.
26
Rashwan (2007), p. 107.
27
Hussein (2019), p. 76 f. quote p. 76.
28
Baumgarten (2006), p. 45 f., 48-50.
29
Ibid. p. 57 f.
30
Ibid. p. 78.
31
Ibid. p. 91.
32
Baumgarten mentions another reason, namely that Israel had no interest in charging the colonial conflict with too much of a religious dimension, which is why there had long been a »hands‐off tactic« towards mosques (ibid. p. 73), although this is no longer the case today.
33
Ibid. p. 49.
34
The fact that Hamas itself denies any rupture in its history and instead presents it as a stringent and harmonious development from Izz ad‐Din al‐Qassam through the MB to the present day does not change this. (Filiu (2012), p. 54.)
35
Baumgarten (2006), p. 76.
36
Filiu (2012), p. 66.
37
Kienzler (1996), pp. 17 f., 28 ff., 56.
38
Halm (1988), pp. 89, 130 f. [English Edition: (2004).]
39
For a comparison between the Protestant and Salafi Reformation, see Murtaza (2016), p. 106 ff.
40
Hochgeschwender (2018), p. 84.
41
Seidensticker (2015), pp. 39-42.
42
Lohlker (2017), pp. 52-54, 106-112. Seidensticker (2015) pp. 24-27.
43
Nassar (2022).
44
Seidensticker (2015), p. 82.
45
Baumgarten (2006), pp. 20-28. Metzger (2005), pp. 58-63.
46
AlDailami (2019), p. 67 f. Partrick (2016).
47
Metzger (2005), pp. 70-73. Seidensticker (2015), p. 75 f.
48
Ibid. pp. 72-74.
49
Mustafa (2013), p. 70.
50
Ziolkowski (2020), pp. 171-74.
51
Hroub (2011), p. 109 f. [English edition: (2010), p. 75].
52
Occupied News (2024).
53
Beaumont (2009).
54
Issacharoff (2011).
55
Reed (2015). Staff (2017).
56
Ynet (2015).
57
Abuheweila / Kershner (2018).
58
Leukefeld (2017), p. 183 f.
59
Nassar (2022).
60
Seurat (2019), p. 31.
61
A further text on these and other aspects of the accusation of anti‐Semitism will soon follow as an aid to argumentation.
62
Kilani (2021).
63
Krämer (2011), p. 165.
64
As quoted in Baumgarten (2006), p. 62.
65
Ibid.
66
Krämer (2011), pp. 150-157.
67
Hafez (2009), p. 175 [English edition: (2010) p. 154]
68
Lewis (1987) [English Version: (1984)]
69
Ibid. p. 165 [in German edition].
70
Flores (2008), p. 153.
71
Ibid. p. 153 f.
72
Mustafa (2013), p. 72.
73
Hafez (2009), p. 180 [English edition: (2010) p. 159].
74
Hroub (2011), pp. 60, 74 [English edition: (2010) pp. 31, 40 – 41].
75
Ibid. pp. 55, 69 [English edition: (2010) pp. 27, 35].
76
Ibid. pp. 60, 69 [English edition: (2010) pp. 29, 37].
77
Hamas (2017).
78
Hroub (2011), p. 70 [English edition: (2010) p. 37].
79
Ibid. p. 68 [English edition: (2010) p. 36].
80
As quoted in ibid. p. 21 [English edition: (2010) p. xxiii].
81
MLPD (2023 a). At the same time, in this pathetic declaration, it presents itself in its typical manner as a victim of »anti‐communist« agitation, while in the same breath, insignificant as it is, it snipes at the strongest force in the Palestinian freedom movement.
82
MLPD (2023 b).
83
MLPD (2023 c).
84
Hamas (1988).
85
Ibid.
86
Hroub (2011), p. 130 [English edition: (2010) p. 91].
87
Baumgarten (2006), p. 59. Hroub (2011), p. 132. [English edition: (2010) p. 92].
88
Ibid.
89
Kommunistischer Aufbau (2018 b).
90
Kommunistischer Aufbau (2018 a).
91
Kommunistischer Aufbau (2018 b).
92
Kommunistischer Aufbau (2018 a).
93
Kommunistischer Aufbau (2021).
94
Hroub (2011), p. 71 f. [English edition: (2010) p. 38 f.]. Wild (2015), p. 154.
95
Kommunistischer Aufbau (2023).
96
Motadel (2017), p. 139 f. [English edition: (2014) p. 112].
97
Gershoni /Nordbruch (2011), p. 137 f.
98
Ibid. p. 288.
99
Krämer (2022), p. 198 f.
100
Achcar (2012), pp. 84-86. [English edition: (2010) pp. 83‐85].
101
Flores (2009), p. 48
102
Scher (2015).
103
Motadel (2017), pp. 56 – 58.
104
Pappe (2017), p. 66 [English edition: (2017) pp. 83‐85].
105
See: Brenner (2007) [English edition: 1983]. Brentjes (2001). Krammer (2010). Nicosia (2012) [English edition: 2008].
106
Achcar (2012), pp. 129-131. [English edition: (2010) pp. 131-133].
107
Zimmer‐Winkel (1999). With contributions by Gerhard Höpp (former GDR Middle East scholar), Danny Rubinstein (Haaretz), Suleiman Abu Dayyeh (Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Jerusalem) and Wolf Ahmet Aries (Islamic scholar in Kassel).
108
Achcar (2012), pp. 123-166 [English edition: (2010) pp. 131 f.].
109
Ibid. p. 157 f., Baumgarten (2006), p. 18.
110
Croitoru (2007), p. 32.
111
Achcar (2012), p. 158 [English edition: (2010) p. 163].
112
Ibid. pp. 158-166 [English edition: (2010) pp. 163-170].
113
Flores (2009), pp. 48-50.
114
Krämer (2011), p. 165.
115
Motadel (2017), p. 57 f.
116
Pappe (2017), p. 48 [English edition: (2017) p. 66].
117
Wildangel (2005), p. 115 f.
118
Ibid. p. 119.
119
Duden (trans. note: dictionary of standard High German).
120
Reinisch (2023 b), p. 11 f.
121
Hack (1983).
122
Rome Statute (1998).
123
Hroub (2011), pp. 87-90 [English edition: (2010) pp. 53-56]. Baumgarten (2013), pp. 115, 133 f.
124
Hamas (2024).
125
Mamdani (2006), p. 239 [English edition: (2004), Ch. 4].
126
Ibid. p. 137 [English edition: (2004), Ch.4]
127
Ibid. p. 305 footnote 294 [English edition: (2004), Ch. 4, footnote 222].
128
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008).
129
Baumgarten (2006), p. 85.
130
Singh (2023).
131
Baumgarten (2006), p. 159 f.
132
Ibid. p. 160.
133
Asseburg (2008), p. 87.
134
Mustafa (2013), pp. 170 – 177.
135
Baumgarten (2006), p. 55. Flores (1988), pp. 86-88.
136
Baumgarten (2006), p. 86.
137
Hamas (1988).
138
Baumgarten (2006), p. 83.
139
Hroub (2011), p. 123. [English edition: (2010), p. 83].
140
Hussein (2019), p. 139-149.
141
Baumgarten (2013), p. 156.
142
Hajjaj (2023).
143
Khalil (2010), p. 102.
144
Baumgarten (2013), p. 164.
145
Ibid. p. 193.
146
Baconi (2018), p. 223 f.
147
Asseburg (2021), p. 198 f.
148
Poppe (2021).
149
Baumgarten (2021), p. 158.
150
Baumgarten (2013), p. 152.
151
Ibid. p. 156
152
Asseburg (2008), p. 89.
153
Ibid. p. 90.
154
Baumgarten (2013), p. 159.
155
Asseburg (2008), p. 90. Baumgarten (2013), p. 162 f.
156
Asseburg (2008), p. 91.
157
Baconi (2018), p. 124.
158
Baumgarten (2013), p. 163.
159
Ibid. pp. 163-166.
160
Baumgarten (2006), p. 92.
161
Ibid. p. 93.
162
Ibid. p. 94.
163
Ibid. pp. 97-101.
164
Wild (2015), pp. 17-19.
165
Mustafa (2013), p. 130 f.
166
Hamas (2017).
167
Mustafa (2013), p. 132.
168
Bamen (2023 b). Wild (2015), p. 139.
169
Pappe (2007), pp. 58, 61. [English edition (2011), pp. 57 – 61].
170
Bamen (2023 b).
171
Ibid.
172
Asseburg (2008), p. 86 f. Baumgarten (2006), p. 189. Flores (2009), p. 96. Künzl (2008), p. 120 f.
173
Flores (2009), p. 96.
174
Asseburg (2008), p. 86 f.
175
Baumgarten (2006), p. 58.
176
Felsch (2011), p. 106.
177
Hroub (2011), pp. 55, 68. [English edition: (2010), pp. 24, 36 ].
178
Meyer (2009), p. 95 f.
179
Mustafa (2013), p. 67.
180
Ziolkowski (2020), p. 131.
181
Hroub (2011), p. 55. [English edition: (2010), p. 24].
182
Baumgarten (2024).
183
Baumgarten (2006), pp. 58, 198 footnote 47.
184
Felsch (2011), p. 106.
185
Asseburg (2008), p. 87. Hroub (2011), S. 60, 69, 185 – 90. [English edition: (2010), pp. 29, 35 – 40, 152 – 157]. Hussein (2019), p. 98 f.
186
Asseburg (2008), p. 86 f. Baumgarten (2006), p. 65 f. Hroub (2011), p. 68. Hussein (2019), p. 98 f. Mustafa (2013), p. 67.
187
Tamimi (2007 b), p. 155.
188
Ibid. p. 150.
189
Achcar (2012), p. 238. [English edition: (2010), p. 252 ].
190
Hroub (2011), p. 60. [English edition: (2010), p. 29 ].
191
Achcar (2012), p. 238. [English edition: (2010), p. 252 ].
192
Seidensticker (2015), p. 90.
193
Hussein (2019), pp. 98 f. 277 f., and as cited on p. 277.
194
Hamas (2017).
195
Asseburg (2021), p. 198.
196
Baconi (2018), p. 245.
197
Hussein (2019), p. 105
198
AlJazeera (2017)
199
Hroub (2017), p. 102.
200
Abunimah (2017).
201
Baumgarten (2019), p. 85.
202
As cited in Seurat (2019), p. 18.
203
Baumgarten (2006), pp. 58 - 66.
204
Hroub (2011), pp. 54 - 60 [English edition: (2010), pp. 23 - 29 ].
205
Meyer (2009), pp. 94 -125.
206
Mustafa (2013), pp. 67 - 74, 119 - 122.
207
Abunimah (2017).
208
Langthaler (2017).
209
Seurat (2019), p. 177 f.
210
Seurat (2019), p. 22, 178 f.
211
Baumgarten (2006), p. 83.
212
Abdullah (2020), pp. 34 f., 63, 83 f., 91 f., and as quoted on p. 84.
213
Baumgarten (2006), p. 85. Abdullah (2020), p. 22 Footnote 106.
214
Ibid. p. 107. Seurat (2019), p. 95.
215
Asseburg (2008), p. 90.
216
Seurat (2019), p. 130.
217
The Cradle (2022).
218
Seurat (2019), pp. 96, 99.
219
Abdullah (2020), p. 195.
220
Seurat (2019), p. 34.
221
The Cradle (2022).
222
Seurat (2019), pp. 96 - 100.
223
The Cradle (2022).
224
Seurat (2019), p. 29.
225
Nassar (2022).
226
Memri TV (2023).
227
Reuters (2023).
228
PressTV (2023).
229
Seurat (2019), p. 4 f.
230
Hoekmann (1999), S. 106.
231
The money is apparently given to Hamas, which then passes it on to the front. (Khalil (2010), p. 102.)
232
Al‐Monitor (2013).
233
Baumgarten (2006), p. 20.
234
Ibid. p. 74. Filiu (2012), p. 64 f.
235
Hroub, Khaled: Hamas. Political Thought and Practice, Institute for Palestine Studies (2. Auflage 2002).
236
Hussein (2019), p. 138 f.
237
Baumgarten (2006), p. 166.
238
Baumgarten (2013), p. 156.
239
Baumgarten (2013), p. 156.
240
Leopardi (2020), pp. 215 - 217.
241
Hussein (2019), p. 149.
242
Hroub (2011), p. 130. [English edition: (2010), p. 85 ].
243
Ibid.
244
Leopardi (2020), p. 218.
245
Hroub (2011), p. 132, [English edition: (2010), p. 92 ].
246
Resistance News Network (2022).
247
Wystrychowski (2023), S. 25.
248
Channel 13 (2024).
249
Winstanley (2024).
250
Mondoweiss (2023).
251
Occupied News (2024).
252
Narwani /Inlakesh (2023). Van Wagenen (2023 a). Van Wagenen (2023 b). Van Wagenen (2024).
253
Hamas (2024).
254
Baker (2024).
255
Reinisch (2023 a).
256
Resistance News Network (2024).
257
Baumgarten (2006), p. 65.
258
Felsch (2011), p. 102.
259
Leukefeld (2023).
260
Marx21 (2023).
261
Baconi (2023).
262
Baumgarten (2006), p. 207 - 226.
263
Hamas (2017).
264
Hamas (2024).
265
Baumgarten (2006), p. 227 – 241.
266
Mustafa(2013), p. 221 – 224, 229 f.

1
The only exception I am aware of is Palästina Solidarität Duisburg (2023).
2
MLPD (2023 a).
3
Rote Fahne (2022).
4
Kommunistische Organisation (2023).
5
Kommunistische Organisation (2020).
6
Bamen (2023 a). Bamen (2023 b).
7
The booklets on the topic by both Johansen (1982) and Harman (1994) are worth reading, even if Hamas is not mentioned in either of them.
8
Baumgarten (2006), p. 10.
9
Johansen (1982), p. 27. Seidensticker (2015), p. 72.
10
Baumgarten (2006), p. 11 f.
11
Gershoni / Nordbruch (2011), p. 219 f.
12
Baumgarten (2006), pp. 12-14, 18-20.
13
Ibid. p. 17.
14
Ibid. pp. 21-28, quote from p. 27.
15
Arafat himself was probably never a member of the MB, but maintained close contacts with it, fought in its ranks in Palestine in 1948 and was a member or even chairman of organizations close to it.
16
Baumgarten (2006), p. 29 f.
17
Ibid. pp. 31-34.
18
Mustafa (2013), p. 122.
19
Baumgarten (2013), p. 64.
20
Ibid. p. 65.
21
Ibid. p. 66.
22
Filiu (2012), p. 64.
23
Flores (2009), p. 95 f.
24
Baumgarten (2006), pp. 34 – 36, 45, 49 f. Hroub (2011), p. 41 f. [English edition: (2010), p. 11]. Filiu (2012), p. 66.
25
Robinson (2004), p. 123.
26
Rashwan (2007), p. 107.
27
Hussein (2019), p. 76 f. quote p. 76.
28
Baumgarten (2006), p. 45 f., 48-50.
29
Ibid. p. 57 f.
30
Ibid. p. 78.
31
Ibid. p. 91.
32
Baumgarten mentions another reason, namely that Israel had no interest in charging the colonial conflict with too much of a religious dimension, which is why there had long been a »hands‐off tactic« towards mosques (ibid. p. 73), although this is no longer the case today.
33
Ibid. p. 49.
34
The fact that Hamas itself denies any rupture in its history and instead presents it as a stringent and harmonious development from Izz ad‐Din al‐Qassam through the MB to the present day does not change this. (Filiu (2012), p. 54.)
35
Baumgarten (2006), p. 76.
36
Filiu (2012), p. 66.
37
Kienzler (1996), pp. 17 f., 28 ff., 56.
38
Halm (1988), pp. 89, 130 f. [English Edition: (2004).]
39
For a comparison between the Protestant and Salafi Reformation, see Murtaza (2016), p. 106 ff.
40
Hochgeschwender (2018), p. 84.
41
Seidensticker (2015), pp. 39-42.
42
Lohlker (2017), pp. 52-54, 106-112. Seidensticker (2015) pp. 24-27.
43
Nassar (2022).
44
Seidensticker (2015), p. 82.
45
Baumgarten (2006), pp. 20-28. Metzger (2005), pp. 58-63.
46
AlDailami (2019), p. 67 f. Partrick (2016).
47
Metzger (2005), pp. 70-73. Seidensticker (2015), p. 75 f.
48
Ibid. pp. 72-74.
49
Mustafa (2013), p. 70.
50
Ziolkowski (2020), pp. 171-74.
51
Hroub (2011), p. 109 f. [English edition: (2010), p. 75].
52
Occupied News (2024).
53
Beaumont (2009).
54
Issacharoff (2011).
55
Reed (2015). Staff (2017).
56
Ynet (2015).
57
Abuheweila / Kershner (2018).
58
Leukefeld (2017), p. 183 f.
59
Nassar (2022).
60
Seurat (2019), p. 31.
61
A further text on these and other aspects of the accusation of anti‐Semitism will soon follow as an aid to argumentation.
62
Kilani (2021).
63
Krämer (2011), p. 165.
64
As quoted in Baumgarten (2006), p. 62.
65
Ibid.
66
Krämer (2011), pp. 150-157.
67
Hafez (2009), p. 175 [English edition: (2010) p. 154]
68
Lewis (1987) [English Version: (1984)]
69
Ibid. p. 165 [in German edition].
70
Flores (2008), p. 153.
71
Ibid. p. 153 f.
72
Mustafa (2013), p. 72.
73
Hafez (2009), p. 180 [English edition: (2010) p. 159].
74
Hroub (2011), pp. 60, 74 [English edition: (2010) pp. 31, 40 – 41].
75
Ibid. pp. 55, 69 [English edition: (2010) pp. 27, 35].
76
Ibid. pp. 60, 69 [English edition: (2010) pp. 29, 37].
77
Hamas (2017).
78
Hroub (2011), p. 70 [English edition: (2010) p. 37].
79
Ibid. p. 68 [English edition: (2010) p. 36].
80
As quoted in ibid. p. 21 [English edition: (2010) p. xxiii].
81
MLPD (2023 a). At the same time, in this pathetic declaration, it presents itself in its typical manner as a victim of »anti‐communist« agitation, while in the same breath, insignificant as it is, it snipes at the strongest force in the Palestinian freedom movement.
82
MLPD (2023 b).
83
MLPD (2023 c).
84
Hamas (1988).
85
Ibid.
86
Hroub (2011), p. 130 [English edition: (2010) p. 91].
87
Baumgarten (2006), p. 59. Hroub (2011), p. 132. [English edition: (2010) p. 92].
88
Ibid.
89
Kommunistischer Aufbau (2018 b).
90
Kommunistischer Aufbau (2018 a).
91
Kommunistischer Aufbau (2018 b).
92
Kommunistischer Aufbau (2018 a).
93
Kommunistischer Aufbau (2021).
94
Hroub (2011), p. 71 f. [English edition: (2010) p. 38 f.]. Wild (2015), p. 154.
95
Kommunistischer Aufbau (2023).
96
Motadel (2017), p. 139 f. [English edition: (2014) p. 112].
97
Gershoni /Nordbruch (2011), p. 137 f.
98
Ibid. p. 288.
99
Krämer (2022), p. 198 f.
100
Achcar (2012), pp. 84-86. [English edition: (2010) pp. 83‐85].
101
Flores (2009), p. 48
102
Scher (2015).
103
Motadel (2017), pp. 56 – 58.
104
Pappe (2017), p. 66 [English edition: (2017) pp. 83‐85].
105
See: Brenner (2007) [English edition: 1983]. Brentjes (2001). Krammer (2010). Nicosia (2012) [English edition: 2008].
106
Achcar (2012), pp. 129-131. [English edition: (2010) pp. 131-133].
107
Zimmer‐Winkel (1999). With contributions by Gerhard Höpp (former GDR Middle East scholar), Danny Rubinstein (Haaretz), Suleiman Abu Dayyeh (Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Jerusalem) and Wolf Ahmet Aries (Islamic scholar in Kassel).
108
Achcar (2012), pp. 123-166 [English edition: (2010) pp. 131 f.].
109
Ibid. p. 157 f., Baumgarten (2006), p. 18.
110
Croitoru (2007), p. 32.
111
Achcar (2012), p. 158 [English edition: (2010) p. 163].
112
Ibid. pp. 158-166 [English edition: (2010) pp. 163-170].
113
Flores (2009), pp. 48-50.
114
Krämer (2011), p. 165.
115
Motadel (2017), p. 57 f.
116
Pappe (2017), p. 48 [English edition: (2017) p. 66].
117
Wildangel (2005), p. 115 f.
118
Ibid. p. 119.
119
Duden (trans. note: dictionary of standard High German).
120
Reinisch (2023 b), p. 11 f.
121
Hack (1983).
122
Rome Statute (1998).
123
Hroub (2011), pp. 87-90 [English edition: (2010) pp. 53-56]. Baumgarten (2013), pp. 115, 133 f.
124
Hamas (2024).
125
Mamdani (2006), p. 239 [English edition: (2004), Ch. 4].
126
Ibid. p. 137 [English edition: (2004), Ch.4]
127
Ibid. p. 305 footnote 294 [English edition: (2004), Ch. 4, footnote 222].
128
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008).
129
Baumgarten (2006), p. 85.
130
Singh (2023).
131
Baumgarten (2006), p. 159 f.
132
Ibid. p. 160.
133
Asseburg (2008), p. 87.
134
Mustafa (2013), pp. 170 – 177.
135
Baumgarten (2006), p. 55. Flores (1988), pp. 86-88.
136
Baumgarten (2006), p. 86.
137
Hamas (1988).
138
Baumgarten (2006), p. 83.
139
Hroub (2011), p. 123. [English edition: (2010), p. 83].
140
Hussein (2019), p. 139-149.
141
Baumgarten (2013), p. 156.
142
Hajjaj (2023).
143
Khalil (2010), p. 102.
144
Baumgarten (2013), p. 164.
145
Ibid. p. 193.
146
Baconi (2018), p. 223 f.
147
Asseburg (2021), p. 198 f.
148
Poppe (2021).
149
Baumgarten (2021), p. 158.
150
Baumgarten (2013), p. 152.
151
Ibid. p. 156
152
Asseburg (2008), p. 89.
153
Ibid. p. 90.
154
Baumgarten (2013), p. 159.
155
Asseburg (2008), p. 90. Baumgarten (2013), p. 162 f.
156
Asseburg (2008), p. 91.
157
Baconi (2018), p. 124.
158
Baumgarten (2013), p. 163.
159
Ibid. pp. 163-166.
160
Baumgarten (2006), p. 92.
161
Ibid. p. 93.
162
Ibid. p. 94.
163
Ibid. pp. 97-101.
164
Wild (2015), pp. 17-19.
165
Mustafa (2013), p. 130 f.
166
Hamas (2017).
167
Mustafa (2013), p. 132.
168
Bamen (2023 b). Wild (2015), p. 139.
169
Pappe (2007), pp. 58, 61. [English edition (2011), pp. 57 – 61].
170
Bamen (2023 b).
171
Ibid.
172
Asseburg (2008), p. 86 f. Baumgarten (2006), p. 189. Flores (2009), p. 96. Künzl (2008), p. 120 f.
173
Flores (2009), p. 96.
174
Asseburg (2008), p. 86 f.
175
Baumgarten (2006), p. 58.
176
Felsch (2011), p. 106.
177
Hroub (2011), pp. 55, 68. [English edition: (2010), pp. 24, 36 ].
178
Meyer (2009), p. 95 f.
179
Mustafa (2013), p. 67.
180
Ziolkowski (2020), p. 131.
181
Hroub (2011), p. 55. [English edition: (2010), p. 24].
182
Baumgarten (2024).
183
Baumgarten (2006), pp. 58, 198 footnote 47.
184
Felsch (2011), p. 106.
185
Asseburg (2008), p. 87. Hroub (2011), S. 60, 69, 185 – 90. [English edition: (2010), pp. 29, 35 – 40, 152 – 157]. Hussein (2019), p. 98 f.
186
Asseburg (2008), p. 86 f. Baumgarten (2006), p. 65 f. Hroub (2011), p. 68. Hussein (2019), p. 98 f. Mustafa (2013), p. 67.
187
Tamimi (2007 b), p. 155.
188
Ibid. p. 150.
189
Achcar (2012), p. 238. [English edition: (2010), p. 252 ].
190
Hroub (2011), p. 60. [English edition: (2010), p. 29 ].
191
Achcar (2012), p. 238. [English edition: (2010), p. 252 ].
192
Seidensticker (2015), p. 90.
193
Hussein (2019), pp. 98 f. 277 f., and as cited on p. 277.
194
Hamas (2017).
195
Asseburg (2021), p. 198.
196
Baconi (2018), p. 245.
197
Hussein (2019), p. 105
198
AlJazeera (2017)
199
Hroub (2017), p. 102.
200
Abunimah (2017).
201
Baumgarten (2019), p. 85.
202
As cited in Seurat (2019), p. 18.
203
Baumgarten (2006), pp. 58 - 66.
204
Hroub (2011), pp. 54 - 60 [English edition: (2010), pp. 23 - 29 ].
205
Meyer (2009), pp. 94 -125.
206
Mustafa (2013), pp. 67 - 74, 119 - 122.
207
Abunimah (2017).
208
Langthaler (2017).
209
Seurat (2019), p. 177 f.
210
Seurat (2019), p. 22, 178 f.
211
Baumgarten (2006), p. 83.
212
Abdullah (2020), pp. 34 f., 63, 83 f., 91 f., and as quoted on p. 84.
213
Baumgarten (2006), p. 85. Abdullah (2020), p. 22 Footnote 106.
214
Ibid. p. 107. Seurat (2019), p. 95.
215
Asseburg (2008), p. 90.
216
Seurat (2019), p. 130.
217
The Cradle (2022).
218
Seurat (2019), pp. 96, 99.
219
Abdullah (2020), p. 195.
220
Seurat (2019), p. 34.
221
The Cradle (2022).
222
Seurat (2019), pp. 96 - 100.
223
The Cradle (2022).
224
Seurat (2019), p. 29.
225
Nassar (2022).
226
Memri TV (2023).
227
Reuters (2023).
228
PressTV (2023).
229
Seurat (2019), p. 4 f.
230
Hoekmann (1999), S. 106.
231
The money is apparently given to Hamas, which then passes it on to the front. (Khalil (2010), p. 102.)
232
Al‐Monitor (2013).
233
Baumgarten (2006), p. 20.
234
Ibid. p. 74. Filiu (2012), p. 64 f.
235
Hroub, Khaled: Hamas. Political Thought and Practice, Institute for Palestine Studies (2. Auflage 2002).
236
Hussein (2019), p. 138 f.
237
Baumgarten (2006), p. 166.
238
Baumgarten (2013), p. 156.
239
Baumgarten (2013), p. 156.
240
Leopardi (2020), pp. 215 - 217.
241
Hussein (2019), p. 149.
242
Hroub (2011), p. 130. [English edition: (2010), p. 85 ].
243
Ibid.
244
Leopardi (2020), p. 218.
245
Hroub (2011), p. 132, [English edition: (2010), p. 92 ].
246
Resistance News Network (2022).
247
Wystrychowski (2023), S. 25.
248
Channel 13 (2024).
249
Winstanley (2024).
250
Mondoweiss (2023).
251
Occupied News (2024).
252
Narwani /Inlakesh (2023). Van Wagenen (2023 a). Van Wagenen (2023 b). Van Wagenen (2024).
253
Hamas (2024).
254
Baker (2024).
255
Reinisch (2023 a).
256
Resistance News Network (2024).
257
Baumgarten (2006), p. 65.
258
Felsch (2011), p. 102.
259
Leukefeld (2023).
260
Marx21 (2023).
261
Baconi (2023).
262
Baumgarten (2006), p. 207 - 226.
263
Hamas (2017).
264
Hamas (2024).
265
Baumgarten (2006), p. 227 – 241.
266
Mustafa(2013), p. 221 – 224, 229 f.